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1 Introduction
This paper studies the relation between multi-period discrete-time and continuous-time
principal-agent models in the seminal paper by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). The
purpose is to obtain a better understanding of the structural elements underlying the
linearity of optimal incentive schemes in some continuous-time models. We share the
view of Holmstrom and Milgrom that the nonlinearities or even discontinuities of optimal
incentive schemes that are typical for static principal-agent models are unlikely to be
robust to changes in the models, in particular, to changes that allow for manipulation
of the information required to implement them. However, the argument presented by
Holmstrom and Milgrom does not make the underlying structure entirely clear, at least
to us.
The Holmstrom-Milgrom paper involves three dierent models:
1. A static model, in which the agent chooses a (nite) vector of probabilities over
possible states of the world. This model is used to show that if the action space of
the agent is suciently rich (of \full dimensionality" in the underlying probability
space), then for any action in the interior of the action set, there exists at most one
incentive scheme implementing this action.
2. A multi-period model, which is a T -fold repetition of the static model. It is shown
that if the technology controlled by the agent is stationary and if the principal
and the agent have utility functions with constant absolute risk aversion, then the
optimal incentive scheme in the T -period model is a simple T -fold repetition of the
optimal incentive scheme in the one-period model, with no attention paid to the
order in which the dierent outcomes arise.
3. A continuous-time model in which the agent controls the drift rate vector (but not
the variance) of a multi-dimensional Brownian motion. It is suggested that this
model can be obtained as a limit of a sequence of multi-period discrete-time models
specied in such a way that the overall duration of the principal-agent relation is
xed and, along the sequence of models, periods become shorter as well as more
numerous. The dierent dimensions of the multi-dimensional Brownian motion
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correspond to the dierent states of the world or outcomes in the static model and
the dierent \accounts" showing how often a given outcome arises in a multi-period
model. As in the multi-period discrete-time models, the assumptions of constant
absolute risk aversion and stationarity in the technology ensure that the optimal
incentive scheme in the continuous-time model depends only on the cumulative
change in this vector of \accounts", with no attention paid to the details of the
underlying time paths.
As reported so far, the results of Holmstom and Milgrom provide for \linearity" of
optimal incentives in \accounts" listing the frequencies of incidence of dierent outcomes,
but not necessarily for linearity in outcome variables such as total revenues and costs,
or prots. This reects the fact that \outcomes" in the Holmstrom-Milgrom analysis
correspond to \states of the world" in the static model which are dened without any
reference to variables such as revenues, costs, or prots that would permit aggregation
across states or - in the intertemporal models - across accounts. Even if such outcome
variables are introduced, it is not clear that incentives should rely on linear aggregates
that treat, e.g., two prot realizations of one as equivalent to one prot realization of two
and one prot realization of zero. This is obviously not an issue if the static model involves
only two possible outcomes. In this case, aggregate prots can be written as a constant
plus the number of times the high-prot outcome occurred times the dierence between
prot levels across outcomes, so trivially linearity in accounts and linearity in prots are
equivalent. However with more than two outcomes, linearity in accounts and linearity in
prots are no longer equivalent, and one needs additional assumptions to justify the use
of incentive schemes that are linear in prots or in some other outcome aggregate.
Within their continuous-time model, Holmstrom and Milgrom give two assumptions
which yield the linearity with respect to outcome variables that they are really after. One
of these is the assumption that the agent's eort cost depends only on a linear aggregate
of the drift rate vector that he controls. The other is the assumption that the principal
observes only a linear aggregate of the dierent \accounts", i.e., the dierent dimensions
of the Brownian motion whose drift rate vector the agent controls. Either assumption
ensures that an optimal incentive scheme involves only the corresponding linear aggregate
of the vector of cumulative changes in \accounts". If the weighting used in these linear
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aggregates reects some underlying outcome variable so that e.g. an outcome involving
the prot realization \two" twice as much weight as an outcome involving the prot
realization \one", the incentive scheme is actually linear in this outcome variable.
Unfortunately, both these routes to obtaining linearity of optimal incentive schemes
in outcome variables are given only for the continuous-time models. In either case it is not
clear what analogues these results have in the multi-period discrete-time models that serve
to approximate the Brownian motion model. In consequence it is dicult to disentangle
the respective roles of intertemporal aggregation in the Brownian motion model and the
additional assumptions in providing for the linearity of optimal incentive schemes.
The diculty is partly due to the fact that Holmstrom and Milgrom are very sketchy
about the relation between discrete-time and continuous-time models. To see that this
is a nontrivial matter, note that in a discrete-time model the process indicating how
many times each outcome has been observed up to time t is nondecreasing in t, negative
instances of observation being out of the question. To get such a process to converge to a
Brownian motion, one must be looking at the \accounts" process relative to some norm
so that a negative change can be interpreted as shortfalls of the actual frequency of a
given outcome from the norm. The question then is where this norm comes from and
how it is specied. Holmstrom and Milgrom do not say anything about this. Nor do they
say anything about the specication of outcome variables and their dependence upon the
periodization.
Our paper lls this gap. We link the one-period, the multi-period, and the continuous-
time models of Holmstrom and Milgrom in a unied framework and explicitly derive the
continuous-time model as a limit of discrete-time models with ever shorter periods. We
will indicate the class of Brownian models that can be approximated this way.
Given our account of the precise relation between the multi-period discrete-time
and the continuous-time models of Holmstrom and Milgrom, we look for discrete-time
analogues of their linearity results for the continuous-time model. Two sets of results are
obtained. First we show that there is no discrete-time analogue for the linearity result
that is based on eort cost being a function of a linear aggregate of the drift vector
that the agent controls. For this specication of eort costs, the corresponding discrete-
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time models involve isoquants that are straight lines in the space of vectors assigning
probabilities to the dierent possible outcomes. Therefore, these models typically have
boundary solutions assigning probability zero to all but very few outcomes. Indeed,
in the absence of any further restrictions the discrete-time models will have solutions
concentrating all probability mass on the two outcomes closest to the target value for
mean returns. Thus, except for a gap left by the discretization of outcomes, all risk and
hence all agency costs of an inecient allocation of risk will disappear. If one looks at a
sequence of such discrete-time models with ever shorter periods these boundary solutions
do not converge to anything resembling the solution that Holmstrom and Milgrom derive
for the Brownian motion model with this specication of eort costs.
Our second major result shows that there is a discrete-time analogue for the Holm-
strom-Milgrom result that in the Brownian motion model a linear incentive scheme is
optimal if the principal observes only a linear aggregate of the dierent dimensions of
the Brownian motion whose drift vector the agent controls. To obtain this analogue, we
assume that in discrete-time, the principal does not observe the time path of the outcome
process at all. He only observes a nal aggregate. Moreover, by the time he observes
the aggregate, the agent may have manipulated it by destroying some returns that had
actually been realized. With this assumption about asymmetric information concerning
outcomes, we prove that the linear incentive scheme that is optimal in the continuous
model is approximately optimal in the discrete-time models if the period length is su-
ciently short. The argument relies on the continuity of certain features of the model in the
transition between discrete and continuous time. Stationarity of solutions to discrete-time
models, which is central for Holmstrom and Milgrom, plays no role here because under
the given information assumption such stationarity typically is not obtained.
Our results link up with the basic intuition that Holmstrom and Milgrom had pro-
vided for their analysis. In motivating their paper they had argued that nonlinearities -
and even more so, discontinuities - in incentive schemes are vulnerable to manipulation
by the agent. However much of their actual analysis does not involve this notion of ma-
nipulation at all. Manipulation enters their analysis only in the case where the principal
observes only a linear aggregate of the dierent dimensions of the Brownian-motion pro-
cess; it plays no role in their multi-period discrete-time analysis or in the other results
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they have for the Brownian motion model. Our results show that for their specication of
multi-period discrete-time and continuous-time models, the linearity result that is based
on asymmetric output observation and the scope for manipulation that this introduces
is the only one that has a discrete-time analogue. Within the context of their analysis,
concerns about manipulation must be the underlying force behind linearity.
This being said, we must however point to the companion paper by Hellwig (1998a),
which does develop a linearity result based on the specication of the cost function,
without any concern about manipulation. However, this result involves a specication in
which variances and diusion parameters are endogenous and eort cost depends on both,
drift rates and diusion parameters. This specication cannot be accommodated within
the framework of Holmstrom and Milgrom which presumes exogenously given diusion
terms.
The Holmstrom-Milgrom paper has given rise to a large literature, but only a few
papers are concerned with the methodological and mathematical underpinnings of the
analysis. Most papers in the literature just appeal to their results to justify the use
of linear incentive schemes in applications; for an example see Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991). Among the more method-oriented papers, Schattler and Sung (1993) develop
a general mathematical framework for the study of agency problems when the agent
controls the drift of a Brownian motion in continuous time; their results strengthen and
greatly extend the continuous-time results of Holmstrom andMilgrom (1987). Sung (1995)
further extends the analysis by allowing for moral hazard with respect to risk choices, more
precisely, choices concerning the diusion parameters of a Brownian motion. Sung (1997)
develops the corresponding analysis for continuous-time agency problems concerning jump
processes. Bolton and Harris (1997) also consider continuous-time problems concerning
jump processes as well as diusions. However they are concerned with rst-best rather
than second-best problems, considering optimal risk sharing and optimal actions without
concern for incentive compatibility and showing that for arbitrary preference specications
risk-sharing considerations will typically call for nonlinear contracts in a rst-best setting.
The above-mentioned papers all work directly in continuous time and do not dis-
cuss the relation between static or multi-period discrete-time and continuous-time agency
models. Multi-period discrete-time agency models and their relation to continuous-time
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models are studied by Schattler and Sung (1997) and by Muller (1997). Unlike Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987) these papers consider multi-period models as T -fold repetitions of a
static model in which the agent 's eort choice determines the mean of a normally distri-
buted random variable. Muller (1997) shows that, as in Mirrlees (1974), in a model of this
type, the principal's problem typically does not have a solution because a rst-best allo-
cation can be approximated (but not reached) by a sequence of incentive schemes using
penalties for low outcome realizations to discourage shirking, the incidence of penalties
becoming ever rarer and the penalties themselves becoming ever more severe as one goes
along the sequence.
1
The conclusion is independent of the number of periods T or the
\length of one period" 1=T in the multi-period model, but when T becomes large and 1=T
goes to zero, the requisite penalties become large and their incidence becomes ever rarer
even if the shortfall of payo expectations from rst-best is kept xed. In Schattler and
Sung (1997) , existence of a solution to the principal's problem in discrete time is also a
problem. To get around it the authors impose a prior restriction on the class of incentive
schemes they admit; with this restriction, they nd that conditions for implementing a gi-
ven strategy of the agent are similar in a T -period discrete-time and in a continuous-time
Brownian-motion model. Neither paper asks how a continuous-time Brownian-motion
model would be approximated by discrete-time models with nitely many possible outco-
mes in any one period or what is the relation between linearity of incentive payments in
\accounts" and linearity of incentive payments in outcome aggregates, e.g. in prots.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section develops the framework for the
analysis by introducing one-period and multi-period models and specifying the role of the
\length of the period" as a parameter of these models. Section 3 considers a sequence of
control paths in the discrete models and shows that if this sequence converges to a well
dened control path in the continuous model, then the incentive schemes that implement
the control paths in the discrete models converge to an incentive scheme that implements
the limit path in the continuous model. Whereas this result takes the convergence beha-
vior of control paths as given, Section 4 shows that this convergence behaviour is actually
obtained for suitable subsequences of optimal control paths and incentive schemes. Secti-
on 5 deals with the case where the agent's cost function depends on expected prots only.
1
In Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), this diculty was avoided by the assumption that the set of
states of the world in the static model is nite.
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Section 6 considers the case where the principal observes an accounting aggregate, such
as total prots, but not the time paths of individual accounts. There we show that Holm-
strom and Milgrom's main result on linearity in aggregates can indeed be approximated
by a series of appropriately designed discrete models. All formal proofs are relegated to
the appendix. In particular, Appendix A gives the formal proofs of all results in the text.
Certain supplementary are given in Appendices B and C.
2 A Discrete Multi-Period Model
We start with the static model. Suppose that there is one period of length 1. At the be-
ginning of the period the agent chooses an action which gives rise to a stochastic outcome
~ 2 f
0
; : : : ; 
N
g. The outcome 
i
2 IR is interpreted as a prot level. Following Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1987) we assume that the agent chooses the probability distribution
p over possible prot levels directly at personal cost c(p)  0. Thus, the agent's action
is p = (p
0
; : : : ; p
1
) 2 P where P is the N -dimensional simplex. Throughout the paper we
assume the following:
Assumption 1 The eort cost c(p) of an action p 2 P is given by a function
c() on IR
N+1
which is strictly convex as well as continuously dierentiable on
some open set that contains the interior of P .
The agent is assumed to have a constant coecient of absolute risk aversion r > 0.
Given an incentive scheme associating the payment s
i
to the outcome 
i
, he chooses action
p 2 P so as to maximize his expected utility
,
N
X
i=0
p
i
e
 r(s
i
 c(p))
: (1)
From the rst-order conditions for this maximization problem, one easily nds that to
implement an action p 2 P such that the certainty equivalent of the agent's utility is 0,
an incentive scheme s = (s
0
; : : : ; s
N
) must satisfy:
s
i
 c(p),
1
r
ln
0
@
1, rc
i
+ r
N
X
j=0
p
j
c
j
1
A
(2)
8
for i = 0; : : : ; N , with equality if p
i
> 0, where, as usual, c
i
refers to the partial derivative
of the eort cost function with respect to p
i
. The argument is a straightforward adaptation
of Theorem 3 in Holmstrom and Milgrom to allow for the possibility of boundary solutions,
i.e., of actions p involving p
i
= 0 for some i. As indicated by (2), if p
i
= 0 for some i, the
corresponding incentive payment s
i
is not uniquely determined by incentive compatibility
considerations. However, we assume that for actions p involving p
i
= 0 for some i, we
may set the corresponding incentive payment s
i
so as to satisfy (2) with equality.
2
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral. His payo from implementing an action
p by an incentive scheme s = fs
0
; : : : ; s
N
g is given by:
N
X
i=0
p
i
(
i
, s
i
) : (3)
Consider now a multi-period version of this model in which the agent can change his
action at discrete points in time. We want to keep the total length of the time interval
(which is normalized to 1) xed, however, and increase the number of periods within this
interval. Suppose that there are
1

periods, each of length  2 f1;
1
2
;
1
3
; : : :g, which are
indexed by  = f1; : : : ;
1

g. In order to make the one-period problem and the
1

-period
problem comparable we have to reformulate the model:
In each period there are N + 1 prot levels 

i
, i 2 f0; : : : ; Ng, which are given by
3


i
= 
i

1
2
8 i 2 f0; : : : ; Ng : (4)
The agent's action p

in each period and the cost of his action will be evaluated as a
function of the deviation of p

from some standard p^, where p^ 2 P , p^  0, is an action
involving zero expected prots, i.e.
N
X
i=0
p^
i


i
=
N
X
i=0
p^
i

i
= 0 (5)
2
If the rst-order conditions for the agent's maximization problem are sucient as well as necessary,
this is without loss of generality. Otherwise, having a payment s
i
strictly below the right hand side of
(2) may serve to discourage the agent from some \far away" action p
0
involving p
0
i
> 0.
3
In their discussion of the relation between multi-period discrete-time and continuous-time models,
Holmstrom and Milgrom do not indicate that the possible outcome values in any one period must depend
on the length of the period (1987, p. 318). Such a normalization is, however, implicit in their analysis
as it underlies their subsequent appeal to the central limit theorem. For a more systematic discussion
of the role played by the dependence of the potential values of period prots on period length, see the
companion paper by Hellwig (1998a).
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for all . The eort cost in a period of length  if the agent chooses p

is denoted by
c

(p

) which is dened by
c

(p

)    c
 
p^
0
+
p

0
, p^
0

1
2
; : : : ; p^
N
+
p

N
, p^
N

1
2
!
: (6)
What is the point of this specication? There are
1

periods each of length . In order to
keep total prots over the
1

periods comparable to expected prots in the static model
we have to keep expected prots per period to an order of magnitude . Consider an
action p

that shifts probability mass from some low-prot outcome to some high-prot
outcome as compared to the action p^. With prot levels proportional to 
1
2
this raises
expected prots by an order of magnitude 
1
2
. However, the agent's cost of this shift in
probability mass is made to depend on  in such a way that the agent will keep the order
of magnitude of such shifts ordinarily to 
1
2
. That is, if the isoquants of the cost function
c() exhibit nonzero curvature, then the deviation of the action p

that is actually chosen
from the zero-expected-prots action p^ will be on the order of 
1
2
, and expected prots
per period will be on the order of .
To make these ideas more precise, dene


i
= k
i
p

i
, p^
i

1
2
(7)
for i = 1; : : : ; N , with k
i
= 
i
,
0
. Note that if the agent chooses p

in each period, then
total expected prots in the period of length 1 are given by
1

N
X
i=0
p

i


i
=
1

N
X
i=0
(p

i
, p^
i
)(
i
, 
0
)
1
2
=
N
X
i=0
(
i
, 
0
)
p

i
, p^
i

1
2
=
N
X
i=1


i
: (8)
For any i, the quantity 

i
in (7) and (8) can be interpreted as the contribution to expected
prots per unit of \real time" that stems from the agent shifting probability mass from
state of the world zero to state of the world i, relative to the standard set be the zero-
expected-prots action p^.
It will be useful to think of the agent choosing the vector 

= (

1
; : : : ; 

N
) in each
period, which then determines an associated action p

(

) where for i = 1; : : : ; N ,
p

i
(

) = p^
i
+ 

i

1
2
k
i
8 i 2 f1; : : : ; Ng ; (9)
p

0
(

) = 1,
N
X
i=1
p

i
= p^
0
,
N
X
i=1


i

1
2
k
i
: (10)
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Since p

is a probability vector we have to restrict the agent's choice of 

by
,
k
i
p^
i

1
2
 

i

k
i
(1, p^
i
)

1
2
(11)
for all i 2 f1; : : : ; Ng and
,
1, p^
0

1
2

N
X
i=1


i
k
i

p^
0

1
2
(12)
Note that the set of 

satisfying (11) and (12) increases and goes to the entire set IR
N
as ! 0.
The agent's cost from the choice 

in a time period with length  is given by:
c^(

) = c

(p

(

)) ; (13)
where by (6)
c

(p

(

)) = c
 
p^+
p

(

), p^

1
2
!
= c
 
p^
0
,
N
X
i=1


i
k
i
; p^
1
+


1
k
1
; : : : ; p^
N
+


N
k
N
!
: (14)
Note that for any given vector  that is independent of  the argument of c() in (14) is also
independent of . The tradeo between the vector 

= (

1
; : : : ; 

N
) of contributions
to expected prots per unit of \real time" that stem from shifting probability mass to
outcomes 1; : : : ; N and the associated eort cost per unit of \real time" c^(

) is thus
independent of .
We are now ready to prove our rst result, which shows that given our specication of
prots, costs, actions and probabilities it is indeed possible to compare the discrete-time
models with dierent period lengths .
Proposition 1 Consider the discrete problem with
1

subintervals where pro-
t levels are given by (4) and where the agent's eort cost as a function of


is given by (14) each period. If for  = 1; : : : ;
1

the agent chooses 
;
=
(
;
1
; : : : ; 
;
N
), then expected gross prots are equal to 
P
1=
=1
P
N
i=1

;
i
, and
eort costs are equal to 
P
1=
=1
c^(
;
), where c^() is given by (13). In par-
ticular, if 
;
=  regardless of  and of the period length , then expected
gross prots and total eort costs of the agent are independent of .
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The proposition shows that if the agent chooses a constant , then expected prots
and eort costs of the agent are independent of . In particular, the trade-o between
expected prots and eort costs is not aected by the length of the period. To be sure,
the implementation problem as seen by the principal will also depend on the variance
and the other higher moments of the distribution of prots, all of which depend on .
However, as will be shown in the next section, when  is small and the agent's action is
close to the standard p^, these higher moments are close to being independent of , and the
incentive payments that are required to implement p

() admit a simple approximation.
3 Approximation of the Brownian Model
So far we assumed that the agent can change his action only at discrete points in time.
Now we are interested in the case where the agent can change his action continuously at
any point in time. In the following we will derive the continuous case as the limit of the
discrete model when  goes to 0.
The following denitions will be useful. Let
~
A
;
i
2 f0; 1g be a random variable such
that
~
A
;
i
= 1 , ~
;
= 

i
, i 2 f0; : : :Ng,  2 f
1
m
g
m=1;:::
,  2 f1; : : : ;
1

g. Clearly,
Prob(
~
A
;
i
= 1) = p
;
i
, and
~
A
;
i
= 1 implies
~
A
;
j
= 0 for all j 6= i. Thus, each
~
A
;
i
has
a Bernoulli distribution, but
~
A
;
i
and
~
A
;
j
are not stochastically independent.
Let s

i
be the incentive payment for outcome i corresponding to (2) when the period
length is , the eort cost function is given by (6), and the certainty equivalent of the
agent's utility is 0. Using (13) and (14) one can write s

i
in terms of the vector 

rather
than the action p

(

) that corresponds to it. This yields:
s

i
= c^(

),
1
r
ln
0
@
1, rc^
i
k
i

1
2
+ r
N
X
j=0
p

j
c^
j
k
j

1
2
1
A
; (15)
where c^
i
=
c
i
 c
0
k
i
is the partial derivative of c^ with respect to 

i
, c^
0
= 0, and use has been
made of the fact that by (6) c

i
= 
1
2
c
i
for all i. (Clearly the convexity and dierentiability
assumption on c() imply that c^() is strictly convex and continuously dierentiable on
the set of all vectors  = (
1
; : : : ; 
N
) for which p^
0
>
P
N
i=1

i
=k
i
and p^
i
> ,
i
=k
i
for
i = 1; : : : ; N .)
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Using a Taylor series expansion of the logarithmic term in (15), the requisite incentive
payment s

i
is now approximated by:
s

i
= c^(

) +
2
4
c^
i
k
i
,
N
X
j=0
p

j
(

)c^
j
k
j
3
5

1
2
+
r
2
2
4
c^
i
k
i
,
N
X
j=0
p

j
(

)c^
j
k
j
3
5
2
+O


3
2

(16)
Suppose that the principal wants to implement the time path of actions f
;
g
=1;:::;
1

.
Then, still assuming that the certainty equivalent of the agent's utility has to be 0, the
total renumeration that has to be oered is given by
~s

= 
1=
X
=1
c^(
;
) +
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=0
~
A
;
i

1
2
2
4
c^
i
k
i
,
N
X
j=0
p

j
(

)c^
j
k
j
3
5
+
r
2
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=0
~
A
;
i

2
4
c^
i
k
i
,
N
X
j=0
p

j
(

)c^
j
k
j
3
5
2
+
1=
X
=1
O


3
2

= 
1=
X
=1
c^(
;
) +
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=0
c^
i
(
;
)

~
A
;
i
, p

i
(
;
)

k
i

1
2
+
r
2
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=0
~
A
;
i
2
4
c^
i
(
;
)k
i
,
N
X
j=0
p

j
(
;
)c^
j
(
;
)k
j
3
5
2
+O(
1
2
) (17)
where we made use of the fact that
P
N
i=0
~
A
;
i
= 1 for all  2 f1; : : : ; 1=g. If we substitute
p

j
(
;
) in the squared term by (9) and (10), use c^
0
= 0, and rearrange by putting the
appropriate terms into O(
1
2
) we get
~s

= 
1=
X
=1
c^(
;
) +
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=0
c^
i
(
;
)

~
A
;
i
, p

i
(
;
)

k
i

1
2
+
r
2
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=0
~
A
;
i
2
4
c^
i
(
;
)k
i
,
N
X
j=0
p^
j
c^
j
(
;
)k
j
3
5
2
+O(
1
2
) (18)
Equation (18) admits a simple interpretation:
4
The rst term reects the total eort cost
of the agent from choosing f
;
g,  = 1; : : : ;
1

. The second term gives the appropriate
incentives to the agent to actually choose this time path of actions. If outcome i is realized
in period  , this raises the agent's overall incentive payment by an amount c^
i
(
;
)k
i

1
2
,
reecting the marginal cost of shifting probability mass towards outcome i. The expected
value of this payment, p

i
(
;
)c

i
(
;
)k
i

1
2
, is subtracted again because in expected-
value terms the principal's payments to the agent depend only on individual-rationality
4
See also Schattler and Sung (1993, p. 337).
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considerations. Thus the second term in (18) is proportional to the dierence between
the actual realization of this prot level and the expected realization given that the agent
chooses p

i
(
;
). It is useful to simplify this term by dening
~
X
;
i
= k
i

1
2

~
A
;
i
, p

i
(
;
)

(19)
The third term is the risk premium that has to be paid to the agent to compensate him
for the randomness of the second term. The last term reects the approximation we are
using; it vanishes as  goes to zero.
Given the way the per-period deviations
~
X
;
i
of realized from expected prots depend
on the length of the period, we nd it more convenient to work with the cumulative
deviations
~
X

i
() = k
i

1
2

X

0
=1
[
~
A
;
0
i
, p

i
(
;
0
)] (20)
from period one to period  . For i = 1; : : : ; N ,
~
X

i
() can be thought of as the cumulative
deviation (up to ) of realized prots under outcome i from the expected value of these
prots under the given policy of the agent.
~
X

i
() will be called the \stochastic process
of cumulative deviations from the mean".
To embed the discrete-time model in continuous time, we use a linear interpolation to
represent the process
~
X

i
() by a continuous-time process X

i
(t) such that for t 2 [0; 1]:
X

i
(t) =

1,
t

+

t


~
X

i

t


+

t

,

t


~
X

i

t


+ 1

(21)
where [
t

] denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to
t

. Note that X

i
(t) is a
random function taking values in C = C[0; 1], the space of continuous functions on [0; 1].
For any deterministic time path of actions
5
f
;
g
=1;:::;
1

in the discrete-time model
we use a continuous-time representation 

() where


(t) = 
;[t=]
: (22)
We can now state our rst main result:
5
We restrict attention to deterministic time paths of actions. Since Holmstrom and Milgrom have
shown that the agent will be induced by the optimal contract to take a constant deterministic action
there is no need to consider stochastic controls explicitly at this stage.
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Theorem 1 Consider a sequence of discrete models with period length ,
 = 1;
1
2
;
1
3
; : : :. Suppose that, as  ! 0, the time path of actions 

(t)
converges uniformly to some continuous function (t), t 2 [0; 1] such that
p^
0
>
P
i

i
(t)=k
i
and p^
i
> ,
i
(t)=k
i
for all t and i = 1; : : : ; N . Then, as
! 0,
(a) the stochastic process of cumulative deviations from the mean X

(t) =
(X

1
(t); : : : ; X

N
(t)) converges in distribution to a process X() which is
a driftless N-dimensional Brownian motion with covariance matrix
 =
0
B
B
B
B
@
k
2
1
p^
1
(1, p^
1
) ,k
1
k
2
p^
1
p^
2
   ,k
1
k
N
p^
1
p^
N
,k
2
k
1
p^
2
p^
1
k
2
2
p^
2
(1, p^
2
)    ,k
2
k
N
p^
2
p^
N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
,k
N
k
1
p^
N
p^
1
,k
N
k
2
p^
N
p^
2
   k
2
N
p^
N
(1, p^
N
)
1
C
C
C
C
A
(23)
and starting point X(0) = 0;
(b) the total cost to the agent converges to
R
1
0
c^((t))dt;
(c) the incentive payments that serve to implement 

(t) with certainty equi-
valent w converge in distribution to
~s = w+
Z
1
0
c^((t))dt+
Z
1
0
c^
0
((t))dX+
r
2
Z
1
0
c^
0
((t))[c^
0
((t))]
T
dt (24)
where c^
0
() = (c^
1
(); : : : ; c^
N
()).
Remarks:
1. Theorem 1 is closely related to Theorem 6 of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and
Corollary 4.1 of Schattler and Sung (1993), who show that in the continuous model
a time path of actions () is implemented by an incentive scheme satisfying
s = w +
Z
1
0
c^((t))dt+
Z
1
0
c^
0
((t))dZ ,
Z
1
0
c^
0
((t))(t)dt
+
r
2
Z
1
0
c^
0
((t))[c^
0
((t))]
T
dt (25)
where Z is a process given by the stochastic dierential equation
dZ = dt+ dB (26)
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with initial condition Z(0) = 0; here B is an N -dimensional Brownian motion with
covariance matrix  that is equivalent to the process X in Theorem 1.
6
In contrast, our Theorem 1 deals with the discrete model and shows that the incenti-
ve schemes that serve to implement the exogenously given sequence of control paths


(t),  = 1;
1
2
; : : :, converge to a continuous function (24). It does not show that in
the continuous model the limit control path (t) is indeed implemented by the limit
incentive scheme (24). However, under the assumptions imposed by Schattler and
Sung (1993, Corollary 4.1), which we will impose and discuss in more detail in Sec-
tion 5, the limit of the incentive schemes s

does indeed implement the limit of the
control path 

(t). Theorem 1 thus shows that the implementation condition (25)
on incentive schemes and policies that Holmstrom and Milgrom obtained in their
Brownian model can be interpreted as the limit of the corresponding conditions on
incentive schemes and policies in approximating discrete-time models.
2. Discrete-time approximations of the continuous-time process Z() in (25) can be
given by specifying
~
Z
;
i
= k
i

1
2
[
~
A
;
i
, p^
i
] (27)
as the contribution to total prots stemming from outcome i in excess of some
\standard" that is given by the probability p^
i
, and
~
Z

i
() = k
i

1
2
"

X

0
=1
~
A
;
0
i
, p^
i

#
(28)
as the cumulative contribution. Using the linear interpolation as before to obtain a
continuous-time representation
Z

i
(t) =

1,
t

+

t


~
Z

i

t


+

t

,

t


~
Z

i

t


+ 1

(29)
of the process (28), we nd that, by a simple corollary to Theorem 1(a), the processes
Z

i
(t) converge in distribution to the process Z() as  goes to zero.
7
6
Holmstrom and Milgrom show that (25) is necessary to implement (). Schattler and Sung consider
a more general model and give conditions under which under which (25) is sucient.
7
Holmstrom and Milgrom provide a sketch of the relation between discrete and continuous models
in terms of the processes Z

() and Z() (without indicating the dependence of period prot levels on
). We have instead focussed on the processes X

() and X() because these processes are of central
importance in the application of Donsker's Theorem.
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To better understand the role of the \standard" p^
i
in the specication (27) and (28)
note that if  is small, and if the agent chooses a constant  in some small time
interval [t; t
0
], we have
E

Z

i
(t
0
), Z

i
(t)

 k
i

1
2
(p

i
(), p^
i
)
t
0
, t

= 
i
(t, t
0
) : (30)
Thus, if the agent chooses ^

= (0; : : : ; 0) for all  2 [t; t
0
], then p

i
() = p^
i
in each
period and the agent allocates his probability mass according to the standard. If

i
> 0 (
i
< 0) he puts more (less) weight on achieving state of the world i rather
than state of the world 0 (as compared to the standard set by p^). This is reected
in the account process Z

i
(t) which in expectation measures how much weight the
agent puts on achieving state i. Furthermore, we know from the proof of Proposition
1 that if the agent chooses a constant , expected prots in time interval [t; t
0
] are
given by
[t
0
=]
X
=[t=]
N
X
i=0
p

i


i
= ([t
0
=], [t=]) 
N
X
i=1

i
 (t
0
, t)
N
X
i=1

i
: (31)
Recall that
P
N
i=0
p^
i

i
= 0. Hence, 
i
is simply the expected contribution to total
prots that stems from the realizations of state of the world i in excess of the
standard set by p^, and the account Z

i
(t) measures the actual contribution over
time.
3. In the continuous-time limit the agent controls the drift rate but not the higher
moments of the cumulative output process. Note that he does control the entire
distribution of the cumulative-output process in the discrete-time models. Howe-
ver, when  is small, implementation of a given drift rate process involves actions
p

(()) close to the constant action p^, the dierence in any period being of order

1
2
. Because of this convergence of the path of actions to the constant path with
value p^, the second moments of the cumulative-returns process in the limit are fully
determined by p^, and the higher moments vanish. The critical action vector p^ thus
serves a dual function in our model: First, as an action vector with a zero prot
expectation it provides a base deviations from which measure the impact of beha-
viour on expected prots (see equation (30)). Second, it determines the \noise" of
the agency problem in continuous time.
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Theorem 1 takes the discrete model as given and shows how to obtain a Brownian
model as the limit of a sequence of these discrete models. We could have proceeded the
other way round, asking whether it is possible to approximate a given Brownian model
with some sequence of discrete models. The following result, which is an immediate
corollary to Theorem 1, gives an answer to this question.
Corollary 1 Let B be a given N-dimensional Brownian motion with zero drift
and covariance matrix . Suppose that if the agent chooses a control process
(), then the agent's cumulative costs are given by the dierential equation
dc = c^((t))dt (32)
and the disturbance process is B. If there exist real numbers k
1
; : : : ; k
N
and
positive real numbers p^
1
; : : : ; p^
N
with
P
N
i=1
p^
i
 1 such that  can be written as
in (23), then to this continuous time model there corresponds a discrete-time
model with period length  in which
- there are N + 1 possible prot levels in each period which are given by


0
= ,
1
2
N
X
i=1
p^
i
k
i
(33)


i
= 
1
2
 
k
i
,
N
X
i=1
p^
i
k
i
!
(34)
- the probability p

i
(

) of prot level i is given by (9) and (10), with

;[t=]
= ([t=]),
- and the cost to the agent in each period is given by c

(p

(

)) = c^(

),
such that the continuous model is the limit of this discrete model (in the sense
of Theorem 1) as  approaches 0.
Corollary 2 requires that the covariance matrix  of the N -dimensional Brownian
motion can be written as in (23). If N = 1, this is always possible. If N > 1, this
condition implies a restriction on the set of Brownian models that can be approximated
by a sequence of discrete models. This restriction stems from the fact that in the discrete
model only one state of the world can materialize in each period. This implies that the
18
accounts
~
A
;
i
and thus also the accounts
~
X
;
i
have a special covariance structure. For
example, it is impossible that the
~
X
;
i
are stochastically independent. Therefore this
restriction is very natural.
In the entire analysis here, the dimension N of the Brownian motion has referred to
the number of dierent prot levels that can be distinguished. Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987, p. 322) oer a second interpretation according to which N refers to dierent
activities of the agent. For example, if N = 2, account X
1
could be a measure of revenues,
while X
2
could be a measure of costs. Thus, 
1
reects the agent's eort to increase
revenues, while 
2
reects his eort to reduce costs. With this interpretation the Brownian
model could have any variance-covariance structure. It is possible to show that any N -
dimensional Brownian motion model (with an arbitrary covariance matrix ) can be
approximated by a discrete model, if we extend the dimension of the discrete model to
2
N
, 1. However, we do not want to go into the details of this approximation here.
8
4 The Convergence of Optimal Control Paths and Incentive
Schemes
Theorem 1 is not quite satisfactory in that it takes the sequence of control paths 

()
and their convergence behaviour as given. However 

() is chosen endogenously by the
agent in response to the incentive scheme s

. Moreover s

and 

() together are chosen
endogenously, subject to incentive compatibility, by the principal and agent when they
initially agree on a contract. One may therefore wonder how relevant Theorem 1 still is
once the endogenity of s

and 

() is taken into account.
8
To sketch the basic idea suppose that the Brownian model is two-dimensional and that 
1
is the drift
rate of revenues while 
2
is the drift rate of costs. To approximate this model by a sequence of discrete
models we need at least two dierent levels of revenues R 2 fR
1
; R
2
g and two levels of costs C 2 fC
1
; C
2
g.
Thus, in each period there are four dierent possible outcomes f(R
1
; C
1
); (R
1
; C
2
); (R
2
; C
1
); (R
2
; C
2
)g,
which means that there are 2
2
  1 = 3 dierent accounts. With this three-dimensional model we can
approximate any variance-covariance matrix in the two-dimensional continuous model by choosing the
correlation between the Bernoulli distributions over fR
1
; R
2
g and fC
1
; C
2
g appropriately. If we want
to allow for, say, M
r
levels of revenues and M
c
levels of costs, we need a model with M
r
M
c
possible
outcomes and hence M
r
M
c
  1 dierent accounts. The problem of getting from these M
r
M
c
  1
dierent accounts to incentive schemes that are dened in terms of just revenue and cost aggregates is
then the same as the problem of aggregation accross accounts that is studied in Sections 5 and 6.
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Two issues arise. First, for some incentive schemes it will be optimal for the agent
to choose a control path that is not simply a continuous function of t, but that may
also depend on the realizations of the prot process up to time t. Second, even if 

()
is a history-independent constant, it is not clear that the sequence 

() should have a
convergent subsequence.
Of these two issues, the rst one is unproblematic. History dependence of the control
strategies causes technical diculties because the variables
~
X
;
i
in (19) are no longer
independent, but in spite of these diculties Theorem 1 can be extended to control
paths 

() that are predictable functions of t and the history up to t, for details see
Appendix B. More importantly, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, Theorem 5) have shown
that in the repeated discrete model there always is an optimal solution to the principal's
problem in which he induces the agent to take the same action in each period, regardless
of prior history. If 

is such a constant optimal control path in the discrete model with
period length , and if the sequence f

g has a convergent subsequence, Theorem 1 can
automatically be applied to this subsequence.
However without additional assumptions, a sequence f

g of constant optimal con-
trol paths in the discrete models will not necessarily have a convergent subsequence.
Indeed in the following section we shall come across a fairly natural example in which 

goes out of bounds, with some of its components 

i
going to +1 and others going to
,1 as  goes to zero. Such a possibility can be ruled out by additional assumptions, but
then one must worry about the compatibility of such assumptions with the specication
underlying Theorem 1.
To see the issue, suppose for example that the vector 

must always be chosen from
a product K =
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
] of compact intervals. With this additional assumption a
sequence f

g of constant optimal control paths in the discrete models will obviously
have a subsequence that converges to a limit 

. Moreover the rst two statements of
Theorem 1 will be satised for this subsequence, i.e. the process X

() of cumulative
deviations from the mean converges in distributions to the driftless Brownian motion
X() with covariance matrix  and the agent's total cost converges to c^(

). However the
requirement that 

2 K will modify the agent's incentive compatibility conditions and
hence the relation between desired actions and required incentive payments; this throws
20
doubt on statement (c) of Theorem 1.
In choosing his action p 2 P , the agent now faces the additional constraints p

i

p
i
 P

i
, where p

i
= p^
i
+
1
2
minfm
i
=k
i
;M
i
=k
i
g and P

i
= p^
i
+
1
2
maxfm
i
=k
i
;M
i
=k
i
g,
i = 1; : : : ; N . Taking account of these constraints in the agent's rst-order conditions,
one nds that the incentive-compatibility condition (19) must be rewritten as
s

i
= c^(

),
1
r
ln
"
1, (rc^
i
k
i

1
2
, u

i
+ v

i
) +
N
X
i=1
(rc^
i
k
i

1
2
, u

i
+ v

i
)
#
(35)
where u

i
 0 and v

i
 0 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers of the constraints p

i
 p
i
and p
i
 P

i
in the agent's problem, with complementary slackness requiring u

i
(p
i
,
maxf0; p

i
g) = 0 and v

i
(P

i
, p
i
) = 0 for i = 1; : : : ; N . Given the appearance of
the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers u

i
and v

i
in (35), it is not clear that the approximation
procedure of the preceding section can be used; for instance, a Taylor approximation of
the logarithmic term in (35) would make sense only if u

i
and v

i
were known to go to
zero as the continuous-time model is approached.
Holmstrom and Milgrom try to avoid this diculty by assuming that optimal actions
always lie in the interior of the admissible set. Presumably such an assumption is justied
if the eort cost function satises suitable Inada conditions. Unfortunately such Inada
conditions are not compatible with the uniform boundedness of the derivatives of the
eort cost function c^() which has been used extensively in the proof of Theorem 1(c).
Therefore we prefer to tackle the problem posed by the Kuhn-Tucker multiplers in (35)
directly, without trying to rule boundary actions out. As it turns out, this can be done
without any substantive change in the model.
From the principal's perspective, the appearance of the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers u

i
,
v

i
in (35) reects the fact that when the action p = p

(

) is at the boundary of
the admissible action set, there is more than one incentive scheme that will implement
this action, so he must consider which of these incentive schemes is cheapest for him. For
example suppose thatN = 1, 
1
> 
0
, and consider the action p which assigns the smallest
possible mass to the outcome 1, i.e., let p = p

(m
1
). This action is implemented by any
incentive scheme (s

0
; s

1
) that satises s

1
,s

0

1
r
[ln(1+rp
1
c^
1
k
1

1
2
),ln(1,rp
0
c^
1
k
1

1
2
)]
and that is individually rational for the agent, the point being that the principal does not
have to provide incentives for outcome 1 because the agent is unable to lower p
1
below the
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stipulated level anyway. Among the dierent schemes that implement the action p

(m
1
),
the scheme s

1
= s

0
= c^(m
1
) is cheapest for the principal; it just compensates the agent
for his cost and involves no risk premium.
Dierent incentive schemes that implement the same action will involve dierent
values of the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers in (35). Using the two-outcome example one easily
veries that not all these Kuhn-Tucker multipliers will be small if  is small, so for some of
the incentive schemes implementing the action p

(m
1
), no analogue of Theorem 1(c) can
be given. However in the two-outcome example one also sees that the incentive scheme
which is cheapest for the principal, namely s

1
= s

0
= c^(m
1
), involves Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers u

1
= rc^
1
k
1

1
2
and v

1
= 0, which do become small as  goes to zero.
This last observation reects a general principle. Quite generally the principal's con-
cern for minimizing implementation costs leads to the use of incentive schemes involving
payments with a mean on the order of  and deviations from the mean on the order of

1
2
, so as  goes to zero an argument analogous to the one underlying Theorem 1 can
be given. This provides the key to the convergence behavior of optimal control paths and
incentive schemes, which we now discuss.
Consider the principal's optimization problem in the discrete model with period
length . By Theorem 5 of Holmstrom and Milgrom, we can restrict attention to constant
controls. A constant control 

2 K in each period, with associated incentive scheme ~s

,
will be optimal for the principal if it maximizes his expected payo
U
P
=
N
X
i=1


i
, E(~s

) (36)
under the given incentive compatibility and participation constraints. In view of the
agent's rst order condition (35), incentive schemes may be assumed to satisfy
~s

=
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=0
~
A
;
i
(w + s

i
) (37)
where w is the agent's certainty equivalent and, for each i, s

i
(

) satises (35) for a
suitable set of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers u

i
, v

i
. It is convenient to write the Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers in (35) in the form r
1
2
k
i
u^

i
, r
1
2
k
i
v^

i
, where for i = 1; : : : ; N , u^

i
 0, v^

i
 0,
and
u^

i
(

i
,m
i
) = v^

i
(M
i
, 

i
) = 0 (38)
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With this change of notation (35) can be rewritten as:
s

i
(

) = c^(

) (39)
,
1
r
ln
2
4
1, r(c^
i
, u^

i
+ v^

i
)k
i

1
2
+ r
N
X
j=1
p

j
(

)(c^
j
, u^

j
+ v^

j
)k
j

1
2
3
5
Upon substituting from (37) and (39) and using the fact that E
~
A
;
i
= p

i
(

) we can
write the principal's objective as:
U
P
(

; u^

1
; v^

1
; : : : ; u^

N
; v^

N
) =
N
X
i=1


i
, w , c^(

) (40)
+
1
r
N
X
i=1
p

i
(

) ln
2
4
1, r(c^
i
, u^

i
+ v^

i
)k
i

1
2
+ r
N
X
j=1
p

j
(

)(c^
j
, u^

j
+ v^

j
)k
j

1
2
3
5
In the discrete-time model with period length , the principal's problem reduces to ma-
ximizing (40) with respect to 

2 K and u

i
2 V , v

i
2 V , i = 1; : : : ; N , subject to the
complementary slackness condition (38) and the incentive compatibility condition:
,
N
X
i=1
p

i
(

)e
 r(s

i
 c^(

))
 ,
N
X
i=1
p

i
(
0
)e
 r(s

i
 c^(
0
))
(41)
which for incentive schemes satisfying (39) is equivalent to
,1  ,
N
X
i=1
p

i
(
0
)e
 r(c^(

) c^(
0
))
(42)

0
@
1, r(c^
i
, u^

i
+ v^

i
)k
i

1
2
+ r
N
X
j=1
p

j
(

)(c^
j
, u^

j
+ v^

j
)k
j

1
2
1
A
for all 
0
2 K.
If the rst-order condition (39) was sucient as well as necessary for the implemen-
tation of 

through the incentive scheme ~s

, the incentive constraint (42) would be
redundant. However because of the convexity of the exponential function, (41) is typical-
ly stronger than the agent's rst-order condition (39) so (42) is not redundant. Even so
it is instructive to consider what happens when the principal replaces the global incentive
compatibility constraint (41) by the rst-order condition (39), i.e., when he maximizes
(40) subject to the complementary slackness conditions (38) without paying attention to
(41). For this \relaxed problem of the principal" we obtain:
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Proposition 2 Let 

2 K be given and suppose that 

i
 0, v^

i
 0,
i = 1; : : : ; N , maximize (40) subject to the complementary slackness condition
(38). Then u^

i
 (

)=k
i
and v^

i
 (

)=k
i
, i = 1; : : : ; N , where (

) :=
max
ij
(k
i
c^
i
(

), k
j
c^
j
(

)).
Proposition 2 suggests that the principal will optimally choose the incentive scheme
~s

so that the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for the agent's maximization problem will be
commensurate to marginal costs and will have the order of magnitude 
1
2
. Unfortunately
we cannot immediately use this result because the global incentive constraint (41) is not
generally implied by the agent's rst-order condition, and (42) is not in general redundant.
However, as  goes to zero, this concern becomes less and less important, the dierence
between the incentive compatibility condition (41) and the rst-order condition (38) di-
sappears, and the incentive constraint (42) ceases to impose any additional constraints.
Formally we have:
Proposition 3 For = 1;
1
2
; : : : ; let IC() be the set of vectors (

; u^

; v^

2
KIR
N
+
IR
N
+
that satisfy the incentive constraint (42) as well as the comple-
mentary slackness conditions (40). As  converges to zero, IC() converges
(in the Hausdor topology) to the set of vectors (; u^; v^) 2 KIR
N
+
IR
N
+
that
satisfy
u^
i
(
i
,m
i
) = v^
i
(M
i
, 
i
) = 0 (43)
for i = 1; : : : ; N .
Given Propositions 2 and 3, another application of the maximum theorem yields:
Theorem 2 Let f

g be a sequence of constant optimal control paths that
the principal wants to implement in the discrete model with period length  =
1;
1
2
: : : when 

is constrained to the set K =
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
]. Let u^

i
, v^

i
, i =
1; :::; N , be the normalized Kuhn-Tucker multipliers induced by the correspon-
ding optimal incentive schemes. The sequence f

; u^

1
; v^

1
; : : : ; u^

N
; v^

N
g
has a subsequence which converges to a limit (

; u^

1
; v^

1
; : : : ; u^

N
; v^

N
). Moreo-
ver, 

is a constant optimal control path and the incentive scheme s

is given
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by
s

(X) = w+c^(

)+
N
X
i=1
(c^
i
(

),u^

i
+v^

i
)X
i
(1)+
r
2
N
X
i=1
N
X
j=1
(c^
i
,u^

i
+v^

i
)
ij
(c^
i
,u^

i
+v

i
) ;
(44)
with (
ij
) =  given by (23), which is an optimal incentive scheme in the
continuous model.
Turning to the optimal incentive schemes, we note that (40) can be rewritten in the
linear form:
~s

= 

0
+
N
X
i=1


i
X

i
(1) ; (45)
where 

0
= w + s

0
(

), and, for i = 1; : : : ; N , 

i
= [s

i
(

) , s

0
(

)]=k
i

1
2
and X

i
is the process of cumulative deviations from the mean that was dened in (20) and (21).
From Theorem 2 one immediately obtains:
Corollary 2 For  = 1;
1
2
; : : : ; let (

0
; 

1
; : : : ; 

N
) be the parameters of an
optimal incentive scheme implementing a constant optimal control 

when
controls are restricted to the compact set K =
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
]. The sequence
f

0
; 

1
; : : : ; 

n
g has a subsequence which converges to a limit (
0
; 
1
; : : : ; 
N
).
The limit (
0
; 
1
; : : : ; 
N
) denes an optimal incentive scheme
~s = 
0
+
N
X
i=1

i
X
i
(1) (46)
in the continuous model. The coecients 
i
, i = 1; : : : ; N , satisfy 
i
=
c^
i
(

) , u

i
+ v

i
where 

and u

i
, v

i
, i = 1; : : : ; N , are the corresponding
limits of 

and u

i
, v

i
along the convergent subsequence.
9
9
In Corollary 1, as in Theorem 1, one can replace the processes X

i
() and X
i
() by the processes
Z

i
() and Z
i
() that were used by Holmstrom and Milgrom and that are dened in (26) - (29) . In terms
of these processes, (45) and (46) become ~s

= ^

0
+
P
N
i=1
^

i
Z

i
(1), and ~s = ^
0
+
P
N
i=1

i
Z
i
(1), where,
for i = 1; : : : ; N , 

i
and 
i
are the same as before and ^

0
= 

0
 
P
N
i=1


i
, ^
0
= 
0
 
P
N
i=1


i
.
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5 Linearity in Aggregates
So far the optimal incentive schemes in the discrete multi-period and in the correspon-
ding Brownian model are linear only in accounts, not in total prots. Specically, total
incentive payments in (45) are equal to a constant plus
P
N
i=1
c^
i
(

)X
i
(1); unless c^
i
(

)
is the same for all i = 1; : : : ; N , this is not representable as a function of
P
N
i=1
X
i
(1),
the total contribution to prots from having outcomes other than 0. In particular, if N
is large, i.e., if there are many dierent possible prot levels in each period, the corre-
sponding Brownian motion is of high dimension and the optimal incentive scheme may
be very complex, much more complex than real world contracts that are often linear in
aggregates, such as total prots.
As noted by Holmstrom and Milgrom, the preceding remarks are moot if N = 1, and
the static model involves just two possible outcomes. In this case, the aggregate bonus
for outcomes other than 0 reduces to c^
1
X
1
(1) and the problem of aggregation across
outcomes other than 0 does not arise. Since any Brownian motion can be represented
as a limit of binomial processes, it is sometimes believed that this observation is enough
to support the linearity of incentive schemes in Brownian models. For a unidimensional
Brownian motion, this is of course correct. However, Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 show
that the unidimensional Brownian motion does not actually yield the appropriate limit for
multi-period problems with multinomial rather than binomial processes. The underlying
structure of the intertemporal agency problem - in continuous as well as discrete time - is
given by the function c^() which indicates the tradeo between the vector of contributions
of the dierent accounts to prots per unit of \real time" and the agent's eort costs per
unit of \real time". The dimension N of the domain of this function is an essential feature
of the economic situation. This dimension corresponds to the cardinality of the outcome
set in the static model as well as the dimension of the Brownian motion in the continuous-
time model. For N > 1, the observation that unidimensional Brownian motions can be
represented as limits of binomial processes is therefore irrelevant.
As mentioned in the introduction, for the case N > 1 Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987) present two variants of the continuous-time model that actually do yield optimal
incentive schemes that are linear in aggregates, e.g., total prots. One of these involves
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an assumption that the principal observes the time path of total prots rather than the
time paths of all the accounts X
i
(). We will discuss this approach extensively in the next
section. The other one involves an assumption that the agent's eort cost depends only
on expected prots rather than the vector of drift rates for the dierent accounts. In the
remainder of this paper we ask what are the discrete-time analogues of these continuous-
time results.
In this section we begin with the second variant. The assumption that eort cost
depends only on expected prots requires that the cost function in the continuous-time
model takes the form
c^() = g
 
N
X
i=1

i
!
; (47)
i.e, the agent's cost depends only on the expected prots he is going to produce: the
higher expected prots the more costly it is for the agent. This cost function seems to
be very natural, it is easy to deal with, and it has often been used in applications of
the Brownian model (see e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) or Itoh (1992)).
10
It is
also close to the specication of Mirrlees (1974), who considers a one-period model where
prots are lognormally distributed and the agent chooses the mean of this distribution.
Mirrlees assumes that the agent's costs are an increasing and convex function of the mean,
i.e., of expected prots.
11
Using (13) and (7) it is straightforward to show that in the discrete one-period model
the cost function corresponding to (47) is given by
12
c(p) = g(E(p)) = g
 
N
X
i=0
p
i

i
!
(48)
In the discrete multi-period model we get
c

(p

) = c
 
p^ +
p

, p^

1
2
!
= g
 
N
X
i=0
 
p^
i
+
p

i
, p^
i

1
2
!

i
!
= g
 
E

(p

)

!
= g(

)
(49)
10
Furthermore, it admits the interpretation that the \tasks" 
i
are perfect substitutes in the agent's
cost function.
11
Schattler and Sung (1997) use the same specication in a discrete-time model that is used to appro-
ximate a continuous-time Brownian-motion model. They run into Mirrlees' problem that the discrete
principal-agent problem has no solution.
12
This specication of the cost function violates Assumption 1 which requires that c(p) is strictly
convex. So far, however, strict convexity of c() has been used in Proposition 3 only. All of the results of
this section hold if g() is strictly convex.
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where
E

(p

) =
N
X
i=0
p

i


i
= 
N
X
i=1


i
(50)
and


=
N
X
i=1


i
: (51)
Finally, let
V

(p) =
N
X
i=0
p
i



i
, E

(p)

2
= 
N
X
i=0
p
i
(
i
, E(p))
2
(52)
and dene

2
 V
1
(p^) (53)
The following result, which is an immediate corollary of Theorem 1(c), shows that in
the limit, as ! 0, the incentive scheme that implements a given action  in the interior
of the admissible action space is indeed a linear function of total prots.
Corollary 3 Suppose that in the discrete multi-period model the agent's cost
function is given by (49) and that the principal wants to implement a constant
action vector 

, satisfying 0 < p

i
(

) < 1 for any suciently small ,
that gives rise to expected prots 

. Let w denote the certainty equivalent
of the agent's utility if he does not work for the principal. Assume that as 
converges to zero, 

converges to . Then also the incentive schemes that
implement 

converge to
s = w + g() + g
0
 (total prots, ) +
r
2
(g
0
)
2

2
(54)
which coincides with the incentive scheme that implements  in the Brownian
model.
At rst sight, Corollary 3 seems to provide for the discrete-time approximations
of continuous-time models involving the cost specication (47) and the linear incentive
scheme (54). However, this interpretation is awed because in the discrete multi-period
models the principal never wants to implement a constant action vector 

such that
0 < p
i
(

) < 1 for all i. To see this, go back to the static model with cost specication
(48). If the set P of admissible probability vectors is equal to the entire simplex, there
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is nothing to prevent a solution which eliminates practically all risk, and under (48) such
a solution will in fact be optimal. Since the eort cost of the agent depends on expected
prots only and since total surplus increases when the riskiness of the outcome is reduced,
the principal will try to implement any target level of expected prots with as little risk
as possible. For this purpose he induces the agent to put all probability mass on the two
prot levels just neighboring the target level. If the set (p
1
; : : : ; p
N
) of prot levels in
the static model has been specied so that neighboring levels are close to each other, the
outcome is \almost" deterministic and the rst best can \almost" be implemented. The
very core of the agency problem seems to have disappeared.
This result holds in any of the multi-period discrete-time models as well as in the
static model.
13
In each case, the variance of cumulative prots is bounded by the square
of the maximum of dierences between neighboring prot levels in the static model. In
the Brownian motion model, however, the variance is given exogenously and the optimal
solution of the principal-agent problem is bounded away from the rst-best. Theorem
1 and its Corollaries are not applicable because the sequence of optimal actions in the
discrete-time model does not have a well dened limit. For any i for which p

i
= 0, by
(7) the corresponding 

i
(p

i
) is negative and goes out of bounds as  ! 0, whereas for
the two indices i on which p

i
is concentrated, the corresponding 

i
(p

i
) is positive (and
also goes out of bounds). Not only does the discrete-time version of (48) eliminate the
core of the agency problem, but also it gives rise to a discontinuity in the transition from
multi-period discrete-time models to continuous time.
The discontinuity in the transition from discrete-time models to continuous time
would not be present if the controls 

were restricted to a compact set K, as in Theorem
2. In this case however the limiting incentive scheme would be given by (44) rather than
(54). The Kuhn-Tucker multipliers u^

i
and v^

i
in (44) would depend on i and would in
fact prevent the incentive scheme from being a linear function of the prot aggregate.
14
13
In (49) p^ cancels out of g() for any  and the agent's isocost curves are still linear in p

i
.
14
In fact, the specication (48) does not t into the framework of Holmstrom and Milgrom's discrete
time model. If c(p) depends only on the linear aggregate
P
N
i=0
p
i

i
, then the corresponding isocost
curves in the probability simplex are linear and there is no natural impediment to the agent's substituting
between, say, p
i
and p
j
. In consequence the principal wants to implement a probability vector on the
boundary of the set of admissible vectors. This is incompatible with Assumption A(iv) of Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987, p. 310) whereby any p on the boundary of the set of admissible probability vectors
is prohibitively costly for the agent and hence for the principal.
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We conclude that the result that the optimal incentive scheme in the Brownian model is
linear in total prots if the agent's cost function depends on expected prots only cannot
be approximated by the multi-period discrete-time models.
6 Approximating Sharing Rules that Are Linear in Aggregates
In this section we develop a discrete-time analogue of the proposition of Holmstrom and
Milgrom that optimal incentive schemes in the continuous-time model are linear in a given
aggregate if the principal observes the time path of this aggregate without observing its
individual components. In terms of formal modelling, the assumption is that the principal
observes the time path of the accounting aggregate z(t) =
P
N
i=1
Z
i
(t) - and hence the time
path of total prots - without observing the time paths of the individual accounts Z
i
(t),
i = 1; :::; N . With this assumption, Theorem 8 of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) shows
that the optimal incentive scheme is a linear function of the value of this aggregate at
t = 1 (e.g. total prots z(1)  z at the end of the period). This result reects the basic
intuition that nonlinear incentive schemes are vulnerable to manipulation.
Unfortunately, however, Theorem 8 has no immediate discrete-time analogue. To see
this, note that in any period  2 f1; : : : ;
1

g the principal observes
P


0
=1

;
0
. Since the
prot in period  is simply 
;
=
P


0
=1

;
0
,
P
 1

0
=1

;
0
, the principal can compute
the individual accounts
~
Z
;
i
even if he observes the time path of total prots only. Since
this information can be used to improve the incentive scheme, the principal will use it in
the same way as before. Thus, for all  > 0 we get again linearity in accounts only. In the
limit, however, it is impossible to derive the individual accounts Z
i
(t) from the observation
of z(t). Thus, if we want to approximate this result in a discrete framework, we need a
stronger form of asymmetric information than is used in Theorem 8 of Holmstrom and
Milgrom. As it turns out, this has a signicant impact on the analysis of the discrete-time
models themselves.
The discrete models considered in this section have the following structure. The
time interval [0; 1] is devided in
1

periods each of length . At the beginning of each
period  ,  2 f1; : : : ;
1

g, the agent observes the past history of prots and chooses his
action 
;
. As in Section 3, we embed the discrete model in a continuous model where
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t 2 [0; 1] and 

(t) = 
;[t=]
. In contrast to the model considered by Holmstrom and
Milgrom, however, we assume that the principal does not observe the time path of prots.
Furthermore, we assume that the agent has the possibility to destroy output before he
reports total prots z^ to the principal. Thus, the principal observes only the revealed prot
z^ 
P
N
i=0
Z
i
(1)  z at date 1. Both of these assumptions are required to make sure that
the principal cannot construct the accounts Z
i
(1) for each prot level i 2 f0; : : : ; Ng.
15
In this model the principal has considerably less information than the agent. However,
the principal could ask the agent not only to report nal prots but also to report e.g. the
time path of prots.
16
Somewhat more generally, the principal could oer an incentive
scheme S(m) which requires the agent to send a message m out of some message space
M(z). This message space will, in general, depend on total prots available at date 1.
For example, M(z) could be the set of all possible prot paths with the property that
total prots do not exceed z. Since the agent can destroy prots unnoticed, it must be
the case that z
0
< z impliesM(z
0
) M(z). The following proposition shows that without
loss of generality we can restrict attention to incentive schemes that are non-decreasing
functions of reported total prots.
Proposition 4 If the principal can implement a control path 

(t) with an
incentive scheme S

(m), then 

(t) can also be implemented with a non-
decreasing incentive scheme s

(z), which asks the agent to report total prots
z =
P
N
i=1
Z
i
(1) truthfully. Furthermore, this can be done so that the utilities
of the principal and of the agent are the same under S

(m) and under s

(z).
The proof is a standard application of the revelation principle and is relegated to
Appendix A.
Note that if an incentive scheme implements a control path () under the informati-
on assumptions of Section 2 and if this incentive scheme can be written as a nondecreasing
15
Note that if the agent cannot destroy output the principal may be able to construct these accounts
even if he does not observe the time path of prots. To see this, suppose that there are three dierent
prot levels,  2 f 1;
1
e
; 1g, where e is Euler's number. In this case the total amount of prots reveals
how often each of the three dierent states occured for any number of periods
1

.
16
Like Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) we rule out the possibility that the principal requires the agent
to report prots at any points in time t 2 [0; 1]. The idea is that the principal cannot monitor the agent
continuously but only at exogenously given discrete points in time. Without this assumption the analysis
is considerably more complicated.
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function of cumulative prots, then it also implements () under the information assump-
tions in this section: First, the incentive scheme is feasible for the principal because it
depends only on total prots. Second, by Proposition 4, the agent will report total prots
truthfully since the incentive scheme is nondecreasing. Finally, when the agent chooses
the control path (), he faces exactly the same incentives under the information assump-
tions of Section 2 and of this section. Hence, if the incentive scheme ~s

() implements
() under the information assumptions of Section 2, then the condition that ~s

() can
be written as a monotonic function of z is not only necessary, but also sucient for the
implementability of () under the information assumptions we impose in this section.
With the condition that nal payments to the agent must be given by a nondecreasing
function of cumulative total prots, the nature of the multi-period discrete-time agency
problem changes dramatically. As a result, the solutions to this problem will no longer
exhibit the stationarity properties that were so useful in Corollary 1. To see the issue,
note rst that in the static agency problem, an incentive scheme involving a nonlinear
nondecreasing function of total prots, e.g., a suitable step function, might enable the
principal to neutralize at least some of the eects of having to condition on total prots
rather than each outcome separately. In a two-period agency problem - and even more
so in a general multi-period problem -, his scope for doing so is reduced as the eects of
intertemporal aggregation set in and he can, e.g., not distinguish whether a cumulative
total prot of two stems from two realizations of one or from one realization of two and
one of zero. Even so, his desire to use nonlinearities of the incentive scheme in order to
neutralize some of the eects of his inability to condition on individual accounts is not
likely to disappear altogether; after all there are limits to intertemporal aggregation, at
least as long as the number of periods as well as the set of possible outcomes in each
period is nite.
Given an incentive scheme that is a nonlinear function of cumulative total prots,
the agent's optimization problem will typically have nonstationary, time-dependent and
history-dependent solutions. To see why, suppose that the incentive scheme is a step
function. If the horizon is far away, the agent's eort choice will mainly depend on
considerations of \global steepness of the staircase", i.e., on the sort of \global" tradeo
between eort and incentive payments that is relevant when he can envisage himself as
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taking the same action repeatedly and wondering what is the impact of the corresponding
movement in cumulative total prots on his own income. In contrast, if the agent is near
to the end of his horizon, he is more concerned about the local properties of the incentive
scheme, e.g., how far away he is from the nearest points of increase or decrease, i.e. the
\nearest steps of the staircase" - and also how large these steps are.
These considerations suggest that under the information assumptions made here the
multi-period agency problem is rather more dicult to study than in the setting of Section
2 where the solution of the problem can be taken to be stationary. At the same time they
suggest that the additional diculties may perhaps be relatively unimportant when there
are many periods and for \most" periods the horizon may be taken to be distant. In this
case considerations of intertemporal aggregation would seem to vitiate any attempt of the
principal to use nonlinearities of the incentive scheme in order to neutralize the eects of
his inability to condition on individual accounts.
The following analysis shows that this is indeed the case. In Theorem 3 below,
we show, roughly, that when incentive schemes are restricted to nondecreasing functions
of cumulative total prots, a suitably chosen linear incentive scheme is approximately
optimal if the number of periods T = 1= in the multi-period model is large. This
provides one analogue of the optimality of linear incentive schemes in continuous time
that is established in Theorem 8 of Holmstrom and Milgrom. The stronger analogue that
optimal incentive schemes in the T -period problem are approximately linear when T is
large can also be established. However this requires considerably more mathematics and
is presented elsewhere (see Hellwig (1998b)).
In this section we assume again that for all  = 1;
1
2
; : : : ; the vector 

must be
chosen from a product K =
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
] of compact intervals, where m
i
< 0 < M
i
.
Combined with Assumption 1, this implies that c^() is continuously dierentiable on the
interior of K with uniformly bounded rst derivatives. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
and Schattler and Sung (1993) assume in addition that the control paths chosen by the
agent lie in the interior of a compact set. Note that the following theorem does not require
this assumption.
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Theorem 3 In addition to Assumption 1, suppose that controls are constrai-
ned to the compact set K =
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
]. Consider a sequence of discrete
models with period length ,  = 1;
1
2
; : : :. There exists an incentive scheme
s

(z) which is linear in total prots such that for any  > 0 there exists a  > 0
with the property that for all  <  the principal's utility loss from using the
linear contract s

(z) rather than the optimal contract s
;
(z) is smaller than
. Furthermore, s

(z) is an optimal incentive scheme in the continuous model
in which the principal observes only the time path of aggregate prots z(t).
Theorem 3 shows that there exists a discrete-time analoque to Holmstrom and Mil-
grom's main result, which says that the optimal incentive scheme in the continuous-time
model is linear in aggregates if the principal observes the time path of these aggregates
only. In our discrete time model there is not only aggregation accross accounts, but also
aggregation over time, since the principal is assumed to only observe the sum of total pro-
ts at the end of the last period. Note, however, that there is some implicit aggregation
over time in Holmstrom and Milgrom as well. The principal observes the time path of
a Brownian motion. However, at any point in time the incremental change \dB" of this
stochastic process is only dened by the integral of the stochastic process between two
(arbitrarily close) points in time. But this means that the Holmstrom-Milgrom assump-
tion whereby the principal observes only the aggregate process
P
N
i=1
dB
i
involves some
implicit aggregation over time as well.
In the introduction of their paper, Holmstrom and Milgrom argued that nonlinearities
in incentive schemes are vulnerable to manipulation by the agent. However, in most of
their actual analysis \manipulation" by the agent does not play any role. Manipulation
enters their analysis only in the Brownian model of Theorem 8. If the principal observes
the time path of total prots only, then the agent cannot be prevented from choosing a
control path that yields a given time path of expected prots at least cost to the agent.
This cost minimization leads to marginal costs of raising prots being the same for all
accounts so that the term
P
N
i=1
c^
i
X
i
(1) in the expression for nal incentive payments can
in fact be written as c^
1
P
N
i=1
X
i
(t), a constant times the deviation of cumulative total
prots from their mean.
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Our discrete-time analysis shows that there has to be some aggregation over time
in addition to the aggregation accross accounts. Furthermore, in our model the agent
can destroy prots unnoticed. Thus, the agent has a lot of discretion in how to allocate
his eort over time and what to report to the principal. The ability to destroy prots
is important because it restricts the principal to nondecreasing incentive schemes. This
monotonicity of incentive schemes is important for the claim in the proof of Theorem 3
that as  goes to zero the set of incentive schemes satisfying (A.44) and (MS) shrinks to
the set of schemes satisfying (A.45) and (MS). Without monotonicity, one might not be
able to rule out sequences of incentive schemes satisfying (A.44), but uctuating ever more
wildly as the range of possible outcome becomes denser and denser and tends towards
lling the whole space.
As discussed in the introduction to this section, as long as  is positive a linear
contract is unlikely to be optimal in the discrete-time model. However our result shows
that it is at least approximately optimal. A linear contract gives a constant incentive
pressure over time so that the agent will not exploit nonlinearities of the contract by
making his eort depend on past prot realizations. Moreover a linear contract is not
vulnerable to manipulation arising from the principal's inability to observe anything other
than the cumulative total prot that the agent has chosen not to destroy. These two
considerations put a bound on any advantage that a nonliner contract might have over
the optimal linear one; moreover this bound is close to zero whenever  is close to zero.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: If the agent chooses 
;
= (
;
1
; : : : ; 
;
N
) in periods  = 1; : : : ;
1

,
expected gross prots are
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X
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i
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
;
i

1
2
k
i
1
A

0

1
2
+
N
X
i=1
0
@
p^
i
+ 
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N
X
i=1

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: (A.1)
Furthermore, we have
1=
X
=1
c

(p

(
;
)) =
1=
X
=1
c
 
p^+
p

(
;
), p^

1
2
!
=
1=
X
=1
c^(
;
) : (A.2)
Obviously, if 
;
=  for all  = 1; : : : ;
1

and all  = 1;
1
2
; : : :, we have
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=0
p

i
()

i
=
1

N
X
i=1

i
 =
N
X
i=1

i
(A.3)
and
1=
X
=1
c

(p()) =
1

c^() = c^() : (A.4)
Thus, in this case total expected prots and total costs to the agent depend on  but are
independent of the length of each subperiod . Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1:
(a) Consider any time interval [t; t
0
], t
0
> t. Suppose that the agent takes action 
;
in period  2 f[t=] + 1; [t=] + 2; : : : ; [t
0
=]g. Then, in each of these periods the
probability that
~
A
;
i
= 1 equals p

i
(
;
) which is dened by (9) and (10) above.
Furthermore, since the time path of actions f
;
g is deterministic, any
~
A
;
1
i
and
~
A
;
2
i
are stochastically independent for any 
1
; 
2
2 f[t=]+1; [t=]+2; : : : ; [t
0
=]g,
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. The distribution of X

i
(t
0
),X

i
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= k
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X
=t=+1
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@
p^
i
p^
j
+ p^
i

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j
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2
k
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+ p^
j

;
i

1
2
k
i
+ 
;
i
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
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1
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i
k
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i
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j
(t
0
, t) +O() (A.9)
where O() contains all terms that vanish as  goes to 0. Thus, in the limit as
 goes to zero, the variances and covariances are independent of the time path of
actions f
;
g.
The stochastic process X

(t) satises the conditions of Prohorov's generalization of
Donsker's Theorem.
17
In particular, note that the maximum of prots that can be
17
See Billingsley (1968), Theorem 10.1 in conjunction with Problem 10.1 (p. 77) and Problem 16.7 (p.
143).
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obtained in any period is given by 

N
= 
N

1
2
and goes to zero as  goes to zero
which implies that the Lindeberg condition is satised. Hence, as  ! 0, X

(t)
converges in distribution to a multidimensional Brownian motion with drift 0 and
covariance matrix .
(b) Suppose the agent takes the time path of actions 
;
,  = 1; : : : ;
1

, where 

(t)
converges to (t) uniformly in t as  goes to zero. Since (t) is continuous, there
exists a compact set K  IR
N
such that for any suciently small  one has 

(t) 2
K for all t. Since c^() is continuous - and hence bounded on K - we nd for the
agent's cost in the limit as  goes to 0:
lim
!0
1=
X
=1
c^(
;
) = lim
!0
Z
1

c^(

(t))dt =
Z
1
0
c^((t))dt : (A.10)
(c) Substituting (19) in (18) yields:
1=
X
=1
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;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
X
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X
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i
(A.11)
+
r
2
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=0

~
A
;
i
2
4
c^
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)k
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N
X
j=1
p^
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)k
j
3
5
2
+O(
1
2
)
From (b), the rst term in (A.11) converges to
R
c^((t))dt as  converges to zero.
As for the second term, the same argument as in (b) implies that for any suciently
small , 
;
belongs to a compact set K for all  , and c^
i
(
;
) is bounded, uni-
formly in  . From part (a) therefore, one nds that for any suciently small 
0
,
the sums
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X
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(A.12)
converge in distribution to
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h
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),X
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)
i
=
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
0
(t))dX
i
(t) ; (A.13)
as  goes to zero, uniformly in 
0
. One also has lim

0
!0
c^
i
(

0
(t)) = c^
i
((t))
uniformly in t, and hence plim

0
!0
R
c^
i
(

0
(t))dX
i
(t) =
R
c^
i
((t))dX
i
(t). Therefore
the sums
P

c^
i
(
;
)X
;
i
in the second term of (A.11) converge in distribution to
the stochastic integral
R
c^
i
((t))dX
i
(t) as  goes to zero.
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Turning to the third term in (A.11), we rewrite this in the form
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By the law of large numbers, the rst of these terms converges to zero almost surely
as  goes to zero. The second term converges to the integral
r
2
R
1
0
c^
0
((t))[c
0
((t))]
T
dt.
Thus, if the principal wants to implement the time path of actions (t), t 2 [0; 1],
such that the agent's certainty equivalent is w, then the incentive scheme that im-
plements (t) converges to
s = w +
Z
1
0
c^((t))dt+
Z
1
0
c^
0
((t))dX +
r
2
Z
1
0
c^
0
((t))[c
0
((t))]
T
dt : (A.15)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: To simplify the notation write
a

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and note that the rst-order conditions for the maximization of (39) with respect to u^

i
and v^

i
under the constraints (38) can be written as:
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Suppose rst that u^

i
> 0 and v^

j
> 0 for some i and j. Then (A.17) and (A.19)
imply a

i
= a

j
as well as v^
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
j
= 0, and one immediately obtains k
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> 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Trivially, any limit (; u^; v^) of a sequence f(

; u^

; v^

)g of vectors
in K  IR
N
+
 IR
N
+
that satisfy (42) as well as (38) for all  will itself belong to the set of
vectors in K  IR
N
+
 IR
N
+
that satisfy (43). To prove the proposition it therefore suces
to show that any vector (; u^; v^) 2 K  IR
N
+
 IR
N
+
that satises (43) can in fact be
approximated by a sequence of vectors (

; u^

; v^

) 2 IC().
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N
+
 IR
N
+
satisfying (43), for any  > 0, let
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and let 

be a solution to the problem of maximizing ,
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also show that (
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) converges to (; u^; v^) as  converges to zero.
The argument is based on Berge's (1959) maximum theorem. For the given incentive
scheme, the maximization problem dening 
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is equivalent to the problem of minimizing
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over the set K. Given the specication of p
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(), minimization of (A.21) with respect to
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with respect to 

. Upon subtracting the constant 1 and dividing by , one nds that
given the minimization of (A.22) is equivalent to the minimization of
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40
As  goes to zero and 

converges to say 

, the minimand in (A.23) converges to:
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By Berge's maximum theorem it follows that any limit of a subsequence of minimizers
of (A.23) must itself be a minimizer of (A.24). Since c^() is strictly concave, (A.24)
has a unique minimum at 

= . Any convergent subsequence of minimizers of
(A.23) must therefore converge to . Since K is compact and all convergent subsequences
have the same limit, it follows that the sequence f

g converges to . Convergence of
the associated vectors of normalized Kuhn-Tucker mulitipliers u^

, v^

to u^, v^ follows by
taking limits in the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for 

. This shows that the given (; u^; v^) 2
K  IR
N
+
 IR
N
+
satisfying (43) can in fact be approximated by a sequence of vectors
(

; u^

; v^

) 2 IC(). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2: By Proposition C.1 and Remark C.1 in Appendix C, a constant con-
trol path  is implementable by an incentive scheme s() in the continuous-time model
if and only if there exist vectors u^ = (u^
1
; : : : ; u^
N
), v^ = (v^
1
; : : : ; v^
N
) such that  and u^, v^
satisfy the complementary slackness condition (38), and moreover s() has the represen-
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The principal's expected payo from using the scheme s() to implement the constant
control path  is therefore computed as
U
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Therefore a constant control path  and incentive scheme s() implementing  are optimal
for the principal in the continuous-time model if and only if  and the associated vectors
u^ and v^ maximize (A.26) subject to the complementary slackness conditions (43).
Now consider the transition from the multiperiod discrete-time models to the continuous-
time model. Expanding the logarithmic term in (40) in a Taylor series and taking limits
as  goes to zero we obtain
lim
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) (A.27)
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for any sequence f
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; u^

; v^

g that converges to a limit (; u^; v^) 2 K  IR
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 goes to zero. In view of (A.27) and Proposition 3, Berge's maximum theorem im-
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1
; v^

1
; : : : ; u^

N
; v^

N
g of constant optimal control paths
and associated Kuhn-Tucker multipliers in the discrete-time problems has a subsequence
which converges to a limit (

; u^

1
; v^

1
; : : : ; u^

N
; v^

N
), then (

; u^

1
; v^

1
; : : : ; u^

N
; v^

N
) maximizes
U
P
(; u^; v^) subject to the constraint (43) so 

and the incentive scheme s

() given by
(44) are optimal for the principal in the continuous-time problem.
It remains to be shown that the sequence f

; u^

1
; v^

1
; : : : ; u^

N
; v^

N
g actually has
a convergent subsequence. Since 

2 K for all , certainly the sequence f

g has a
subsequence which converges to a limit 

. To economize on notation, we identify the
convergent subsequence with the original sequence. For each , let u^

= (u^

1
; : : : ; u^

N
),
v^

= (v^

1
; : : : ; v^

N
) be the solution to the principal's \relaxed problem" of maximizing
U
P
(

; u^; v^) with respect to u^ and v^ subject only to the complementary slackness con-
ditions (38). By Proposition 2, we have u^

i

(

)
k
i
and v^

i

(

)
k
i
for all i and all
, hence u^

i

^
k
i
and v^

i

^
k
i
for all i and all . The sequence fu^

; v^

g must there-
fore have a convergent subsequence. Moreover another application of Berge's maximum
theorem shows that any limit (u^

; v^

) of a subsequence of fu^

; v^

g must be maximizing
U
P
(

; u^; v^) over the set of (u^; v^) satisfying (43). Given that the function U
P
(

; ; ) is
strictly concave, the latter maximizer is unique, so the limit (u^

; v^

) must be the same
for all convergent subsequences of fu^

; v^

g, and the sequence fu^

; v^

g itself must be
converging to (u^

; v^

).
We claim that the \true" vectors of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers u^

and v^

must
also be converging to u^

and v^

, so (

; u^

; v^

) is indeed a limit point of the sequence
f

; u^

1
; v^

1
; : : : ; u^

N
; v^

N
g. Let U
P
be the maximum value of U
P
(; ; ) subject to the
constraint (43). In view of (A.27) and the denition of (u^

and v^

, we have:
lim sup
!0
U
P
(

; u^

; v^

)  lim
!0
U
P
(

; ^

; v^

)
= U
P
(

; u^

; v^

)  U
P
: (A.29)
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From Proposition 3 and (A.27), we also know that there exists a sequence f

; u
0
; v
0
g
such that for any , 

; u
0
; v
0
) 2 IC() and moreover lim
!0
U
P
(

; u
0
; v
0
) =
U
P
. Given the denition of f

; u^

1
; v^

1
; : : : ; u^

N
; v^

N
g it follows that
lim inf
!0
U
P
(

; u^

; v^

)  U
P
: (A.30)
Upon combining (A.29) and (A.30), we conclude that
lim
!0
U
P
(

; u^

; v^

) = lim
!0
U
P
(

; u^

; v^

) = U
P
(

; u^

; v^

) = U
P
: (A.31)
For any , let (u
00
; v
00
) be an arbitrary convex combination of (u^

; v^

) and (u^

; v^

).
Since U
P
(

; ; ) is concave and, by the denition of (u^

; v^

), U
P
(

; u^

; v^

) 
U
P
(

; u^

; v^

) for all , we have U
P
(

; u^

; v^

)  U
P
(

; u
00
; v
00
)  U
P
(

; u^

; v^

)
for all , so (A.31) implies:
lim
!0
U
P
(

; u
00
; v
00
) = U
P
(

; u^

; v^

) = U
P
: (A.32)
Given that (u^

; v^

) maximizes the strictly concave function U
P
(

; ; ) under the cons-
traint (43) - and any limit point of the sequence fu
00
; v
00
g will also satisfy (43) -,
it follows that any convergent subsequence of convex combinations of (u^

; v^

) and
(u^

; v^

) must actually converge to (u^

; v^

). This in turn implies that the sequence
fu^

; v^

g itself converges to (u^

; v^

), so (

; u^

; v^

) is indeed a limit point of the se-
quence f

; u^

1
; v^

1
; : : : ; u^

N
; v^

N
g. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider an incentive scheme S

(m) that implements 

(t). If
total prots at t = 1 are given by z, the agent reports
m

(z) 2 arg max
m2M(z)
S

(m) (A.33)
Consider now a mechanism s

(z) which is dened by s

(z) = S

(m

(z)). If m

(z) is an
optimal announcement given z under S

(m), then z must be an optimal announcement
under s

(z). Suppose not. If total prots are given by z, then the agent cannot report
z^ > z. If he reports z^ < z, his payo is
s

(z^)  S

(m

(z^))  S

(m

(z))  s

(z) (A.34)
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sinceM(z^)  M(z). Hence, the mechanism s

(z) induces the agent to report total prots
truthfully. Furthermore, it follows from (A.34) that s

(z) is non-decreasing.
We now have to show that s

(z) induces the agent to choose the same path of action


(t) as S

(m). Since S

(m) implements 

(t) it must be the case that
EU
A
(S

(m

(z)) j 

(t))  EU
A
(S

(m

(z)) j ^

(t)) (A.35)
for all admissible paths of actions ^

(t). However, since s

(z) induces the agent to report
total prots truthfully, we have
EU
A
(s

(z) j 

(t)) = EU
A
(S

(m

(z)) j 

(t))
 EU
A
(S

(m

(z)) j ^

(t)) = EU
A
(s

(z) j ^

(t)) (A.36)
for all admissible paths of actions ^

(t). Hence, s

(z) also implements 

(t).
Finally, since s

(z) implements the same time path of actions and yields the same
payments to the agent as the old contract S

(m), the expected utilities of the principal
and the agent must also be the same. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3: Note rst that
Z

i

1


= X

i

1


+
1=
X
=1

;
i
(A.37)
Hence, we can write s

() as a function of x =
P
N
i=1
X

i

1


rather than z. Furthermore,
if s() is nondecreasing in x, it is also nondecreasing in z.
For any , let ~
;
,  = 1; :::;
1

, and s

() be a control strategy and an incentive
scheme that solve the principal's problem in the discrete-time problem with period length
. Formally, the control strategy ~
;
,  = 1; :::
1

, and incentive scheme s

() maximize
the principal's expected payo,
E
2
4
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=1
~
;
i
, s

 
N
X
i=1
X

i

1


!
3
5
(A.38)
subject to the constraints
(IR) If the agent chooses the control path ~
;
,  = 1; : : : ;
1

he gets at least his
reservation utility ,e
 rw
.
44
(IC) Given the incentive scheme s

() it is indeed optimal for the agent to choose
the control path ~
;
.
(MS) The sharing rule s

(x) is nondecreasing in x.
By Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, Theorem 4) we know that the control strategy ^
;
is implemented by sharing rule s

if and only if cumulative payments under this scheme
can be written as a sum of payments under incentive schemes s
;
that would implement
^
;
in the static problem,  = 1; : : : ;
1

. Furthermore, we have shown in Proposition 2
of Section 4 that the action ~
;
can be implemented by ~s
;
only if ~s
;
satises
~s
;
i
= c^(

),
1
r
ln
h
1, r(c^
i
(
;
), u
;
i
+ v
;
i
)k
i

1
2
(A.39)
+r
N
X
j=0
p

j
(c^
j
(
;
), u
;
j
+ v
;
j
)k
j

1
2
3
5
for some vectors u^
;
= (u^
;
1
; : : : ; u^
;
N
), v^
;
= (v^
;
1
; : : : ; v^
;
N
). It follows that the
principal's maximal expected payo in problem (A.38) with the constraints (IR), (IC),
and (MS) is no larger than the payo he would obtain if he chose a control strategy ^
;
,
an incentive scheme s^

, and vectors u^
;
, v^
;
to maximize the expression:
E
2
4
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=1

;
i
1=
X
=1
c^(
;
) +
1
r
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=1
 
~
X
;
i
k
i

1
2
+ p

i
!
(A.40)
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2
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N
X
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p

j
(c^
j
(
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), u
;
j
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j
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1
2
1
A
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under the constraints that
s

 
N
X
i=1
~
X

i

1


!
= w +
1=
X
=1
c^(
;
i
),
1
r
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=1
 
~
X
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i
k
i

1
2
+ p

i
!
(A.41)
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1, r(c^
i
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i
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;
i
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i

1
2
+ r
N
X
j=0
p

j
(c^
j
(
;
), u
;
j
+ v
;
j
)k
j

1
2
1
A
with probability one, and (MS) s

() is a nondecreasing function.
Let ^
;
, s^
;
, u^
;
, v^
;
be a solution to this problem. By Proposition 2, u^
;
and
v^
;
belong to the compact set [0; G]
N
where G is the maximum of max
i
()
k
i
over K.
Using a Taylor expansion for the logarithmic term, we therefore nd that for any  > 0
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the value of (A.38) is no larger than
E
2
4
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=1
^
;
i
,
N
X
i=1
c^(^
;
),
r
2
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=1
p^
i
 

i
(^
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)k
i
,
N
X
i=1
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j

j
(^
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)k
j
!
2
3
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,w, ;
(A.42)
where 
i
(
;
) = c^
i
(
;
) , u
;
i
+ v
;
i
, if  is suciently close to zero. Here we have
made use of the fact that the expected value of the linear term of the Taylor expansion is
zero and the fact that for each  and i, conditional on ^
;
, the coecient (
~
X
;
i
=k
i

1
2
+
p

i
(^
;
)) =
~
A
;
i
of the logarithmic term has expected value p

i
(^
;
) = p^
i
+O(
1
2
) and
variance p

i
(^
;
)(1,p

i
(^
;
)), so for the quadratic term of the Taylor expansion, which
is proportional to , this coecient may be approximated by p^
i
if  is suciently small.
At this point it is convenient to rewrite (A.42) and (A.38) using continuous-time no-
tation. In continuous-time notation, our preceding argument can be summarized as saying
that for any  > 0 and any suciently small , in the
1

-period problem, the principal's
maximal expected payo is no larger than  plus the maximum of the expression
E
2
6
4
Z
1
0
N
X
i=1
^

i
(t)dt,
Z
1
0
c^(^

(t))dt,
r
2
Z
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N
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@

i
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
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,
N
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j
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
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j
1
A
2
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3
7
5
,w
(A.43)
with respect to the control strategy 

() and an incentive scheme s

() satisfying
(PL) 

() is piecewise linear with 

(t) = 
;[t=]
, and
s

 
N
X
i=1
X

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!
= w +
Z
1
0
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
(t))dt (A.44)
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
(t))k
j

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2
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A
dt
with probability one, and (MS) s

() is a nondecreasing function.
By Proposition B.1 in Appendix B we know that as  goes to zero, the disturbance
process converges uniformly to a Brownian motion with initial value B(0) = 0, zero drift
and covariance matrix . Given that the range of this Brownian motion can be identied
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with the set of all continuous functions of [0; 1] into IR
N
, it follows that as  goes to zero
the set of pairs of control strategies 

() and incentive schemes s

() satisfying (A.44)
as well as (MS) shrinks to the set of pairs of control strategies () and incentive schemes
s() satisfying
s

 
N
X
i=1
X

i
(1)
!
= w +
Z
1
0
c^(

(t))dt (A.45)
+
Z
1
0
N
X
i=1

i
((t))dX
i
(t)dt+
r
2
Z
1
0

0
((t))[
0
((t))]
T
dt
with probability one and (MS) s() is a nondecreasing function. Hence, for all  > 0 and
any suciently small , the maximum value of (A.43) under the constraints (PL), (A.44)
and (MS) is no less than  plus the maximum value of
Z
1
0
N
X
i=1

i
(t)dt,
Z
1
0
c^((t))dt,
r
2
Z
1
0

0
((t))[
0
((t))]
T
dt, w (A.46)
under the constraints (A.45) and (MS).
Now compare the problem of maximizing (A.46) under the constraints (A.45) and
(MS) to the continuous-time problem with controls 
i
(t) as discussed in Appendix C.
In this appendix, as well as in Holmstom and Milgrom (1987, Theorem 8), the principal
maximizes the same payo function but the incentive scheme can be a function of the entire
time path of the aggregate
P
N
i=1
X
i
(). Proposition C.2 shows that this problem is solved
by a constant control path 

and a linear sharing rule s

(z) = 
0
+
1
z that depends only
on accumulated total prots at time 1, z, with 
1
= 
1
(

) = 
2
(

) = : : : = 
N
(

) > 0
and 
0
= c^(

), c^
0
(

)
T


+
r
2

0
(

)[
0
(

)]
T
. Clearly, a constant time path of actions
satises our restriction (PL). Furthermore, the incentive scheme also satises (MS') and
(IC). Hence, the optimal solution to Holmstrom and Milgrom's optimization problem is
also the solution to the problem of maximizing (A.46) under the constraints (A.45) and
(MS).
If we substitute the maximizer 

on the right-hand side of (A.46), we nd that for
any  > 0 and any suciently small , the maximum value of the principal's expected
payo (A.38) in the
1

-period discrete-time problem with the constraints (IR), (IC) and
(MS) is no larger than
N
X
i=1


i
, c^(

),
r
2

0
(

)[
0
(

)]
T
, w + 2 : (A.47)
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Using the entire approximation argument in reverse, we also nd that for given  > 0 and
any suciently small , (A.47) is no larger than
E
2
4
1=
X
=1
N
X
i=1


i
, s
 
N
X
i=1
~
X

i

1


!
3
5
+ 3 ; (A.48)
where for any , 

is the agent's (unique) optimal action when faced with the linear
scheme s(). Upon setting  = =3, we obtain the conclusion of Theorem 3. Q.E.D.
Appendix B
In this appendix we discuss the relationship between discrete-time and continous-time
strategies and outcome processes when the agent's choice at any one time may depend
on the history of the process up to this time. In the multi-period discrete-time model
with period length , the agent chooses a sequence of possibly history-dependent controls
f~
;
g
1=
=1
. This choice generates a sequence f~
;
g
1=
=1
of random prot levels. We assume
that for each  , the agent's control choice ~
;
is given by a - possibly degenerate - function
of prot realizations prior to  , i.e., that we can write
~
;
= ^
;
(~
;1
; :::; ~
; 1
) (B.1)
for all  , and we identify the agent's strategy with the sequence of functions f^
;
g
1=
=1
.
The range of each function ^
;
is taken to be the compact set K =
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
]. Given
the control strategy f^
;
g
1=
=1
the prot sequence f~
;
g
1=
=1
is assumed to satisfy the
condition that for each  2 f1; :::; 1=g, ~
;
takes values in f
0

1
2
; :::; 
N

1
2
g and, for
given 
;1
; :::; 
; 1
Prob(f~
;
= 
i

1
2
g j ~
;1
= 
;1
; :::; ~
; 1
= 
; 1
) (B.2)
= p

i
(^
;
(
;1
; :::; 
; 1
))
As in the text, a given control strategy f^
;
g
1=
=1
and associated prot sequence f~
;
g
1=
=1
are used to dene counting variables
~
A
;
i
; i = 0; 1; :::; N;  = 1; :::;
1

; = 1;
1
2
; ::: such
that
~
A
;
i
= 1 , ~
;
= 
i

1
2
and
~
A
;
i
= 0 , ~
;
6= 
i

1
2
: From (B.2) one obviously
has:
E[
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; 1
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; 1
]  p
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)) (B.3)
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It follows that if we dene
~
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i
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we have
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]  0 (B.5)
i.e., for any  the process f(
~
X

1
(); :::;
~
X

N
())g
1=
=1
is a martingale. Again using a li-
near interpolation to embed the processes f(
~
X

1
(); :::;
~
X

N
())g
1=
=1
in a continuous-time
formulation, we write for any i and any t 2 [0; 1]:
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where again [
t

] denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to
t

. For any ;
(X

1
(); :::; X

N
()) is a random function taking values in the space C
N
[0; 1] of continuous
functions from [0; 1] into IR
N
. The distribution of (X

1
(); :::; X

N
()) depends on the
chosen control strategy of the agent.
Proposition B.1 For  = 1;
1
2
;
1
3
; : : : ; let f^
;
g
1=
=1
be a control strategy ta-
king values in the compact set K =
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
], and consider the induced pro-
cess (X

1
(); :::; X

N
()). As  converges to zero, the processes (X

1
(); :::; X

N
())
converge in distribution to the Gaussian process B() with initial value B(0) =
0, zero drift, and covariance matrix .
Proof: For any , let f~
;
g
1=
=1
be the random prot sequence that is induced by the
control strategy f^
;
g
1=
=1
. For any  and any t 2 [0; 1], let F

t
be the -algebra on the
underlying probability space that is generated by the random variables ~
;1
; :::; ~
;[t=]
:
Fix some vector q 2 IR
N
; and consider the stochastic process X

q
() on [0; 1] such that
for any t 2 [0; 1],
X

q
(t) =
N
X
i=1
q
i
X

i
(t) (B.7)
For any t and , (B.5) and (B.6) yield:
E[X

q
([t=] +),X

q
([t=])jF

t
] = E[
N
X
i=1
q
i
~
X
;[t=]+
i
jF

t
] = 0 (B.8)
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For any two vectors q
1
; q
2
2 IR
N
, one also has:
E[(X

q
1
([t=] +) , X

q
1
([t=])(X

q
2
([t=] +),X

q
2
([t=])jF

t
]
= E[
N
X
i=1
N
X
j=1
q
1
i
~
X
;[t=]+
i
q
2
j
~
X
;[t=]+
j
jF

t
]
= E[
N
X
i=1
q
1
i
q
2
i
k
2
i
 (1, p

i
(~
;[t=]
)) p

i
(~
;[t=]
)jF

t
]
,E[
N
X
i=1
X
j 6=i
q
1
i
q
2
j
k
i
k
j
 p

i
(~
;[t=]
) p

j
(~
;[t=]
)jF

t
]
=
N
X
i=1
q
1
i
q
2
i
k
2
i
 p^
i
,
N
X
i=1
N
X
j=1
q
1
i
q
2
j
k
i
k
j
 p^
i
p^
j
+O()
=
N
X
i=1
N
X
j=1
q
1
i
q
2
j

ij
 +O() (B.9)
where 
ij
is the ij-th element of the matrix  (see (23) in the text) and O() is a term
that goes to zero when  goes to zero, uniformly in strategies and histories.
Now consider the vector process
X

Q
= (X

q
1
; :::; X

q
N
)
where q
1
; :::; q
N
are eigenvectors of the matrix ; normed so that q
r 0
q
r
= 
 1
r
where 
r
is the eigenvalue of  that corresponds to q
r
. Given that  is a symmetric, positive
denite matrix, the eigenvectors q
r
; q
s
; r 6= s; are mutually orthogonal. For this choice of
q
1
; :::; q
N
, (B.9) yields:
E[(X

q
r
([t=] +) , X

q
r
([t=])(X

q
s
([t=] +),X

q
s
([t=])jF

t
]
=
N
X
i=1
N
X
j=1
q
r
i
q
s
j

ij
 +O()
=
N
X
i=1
q
r
i

s
q
s
i
+O()
= 
rs
+O() (B.10)
where 
ij
= 1 if i = j and 
ij
= 0 if i 6= j.
Finally we also have, for any " > 0; any t and any i,
ProbfjX

q
i
([t=] +),X

q
i
([t=]j  "jF

t
g = 0 (B.11)
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for any  < ["=max jk
j
j]
2
:
From (B.8), (B.10), and (B.11), one easily sees that the processes X

Q
; = 1;
1
2
;
1
2
; :::
satisfy the assumptions of Theorems 6 and 7 of Gihman and Skorohod (1979, p.195). It fol-
lows that for any t, as  converges to zero, the conditional distributions of fX

Q
(t
0
)g
t
0
2[t;1]
given F

t
converge to the conditional distribution of a standard N -dimensional Brownian
motionW (:) on [t; 1] given the \initial" valueW (t). In particular the overall distributions
of the processes X

Q
on [0; 1] converge to the distribution of a standard Browninan motion
on [0; 1] with ininital value W (0) = 0:
Given this convergence result, the proposition follows from Theorem 5.1 of Billingsley
(1968, p.30) in conjunction with the observation that for any ; one has (X

1
(:); :::; X

N
(:)) =
(Q
0
)
 1
X

Q
. Q.E.D.
Appendix C
In this appendix we analyse the continuous-time agency problem with controls restricted
to a product of compact intervals. In the continuous-time model, the principal's problem
is to choose a functional s() on the space of continuous functions from [0; 1] into IR
N
and
an admissible control process (), taking values in
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
] , so as to maximize the
expectation of
R
1
0
P
N
i=1

i
(t)dt,s(X) subject to the constraint (i) that given the incentive
scheme s(), the agent is willing to choose the control process (), and (ii) that the
resulting expected utility of the agent be at least as large as , exp(,rw), his expected
utility elsewhere. If an incentive scheme s() and a control process () satisfy both these
constraints, we say that s() implements (). For a precise denition of admissibility of a
control process, as well as other details of the formulation of the principal's problem and
its analysis, we refer the reader to Schattler and Sung (1993). Under our assumptions,
their results are easily adapted to yield:
Proposition C.1 An admissible control process 

() is implementable by so-
me incentive scheme s

() if and only if there exist nonnegative-valued adapted
processes u
i
(), v
i
(), i = 1; : : : ; N , such that for (almost) every t 2 [0; 1], with
probability one, the (possibly history dependent) control 

(t) minimizes the
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expresssion
c^((t)),
N
X
i=1
[c^
i
((t)), u
i
(t) + v
i
(t)]
i
(t) (C.1)
under the constraints (i) (t) 2
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
], and (ii) the incentive scheme
s

() has the representation:
s

(X) = w +
Z
1
0
c^(

(t))dt+
Z
1
0
N
X
i=1
[c^
i
(

(t)), u
i
(t) + v
i
(t)]dX(t) (C.2)
+
r
2
Z
1
0
N
X
i=1
N
X
j=1
[c^
i
(

(t)), u
i
(t) + v
i
(t)]
ij
[c^
j
(

(t)), u
j
(t) + v
j
(t)]dt
where  = (
ij
) is the covariance matrix of the N-dimensional Brownian
motion that is specied in Theorem 1.
Remark C.1: Given the assumption that c^() is convex, the condition that 

minimi-
ze (C.1) over the set K =
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
] is equivalent to the complementary slackness
condition that
u
i
(t)[

i
(t),m
i
] = v
i
(t)[M
i
, 

i
(t)] (C.3)
for all i.
Proof of Proposition C.1: The argument involves a straightforward modication of the
proof of Theorem 4.2 of Schattler and Sung (1993, pp. 352f) to take account of the
possibility of boundary values of the controls. If s

() implements the control process 

(),
then by Theorem 4.1, p. 348, of Schattler and Sung, there exist adapted processes V ()
and rV (), taking values in IR
 
and in IR
N
+
such that for almost every t, with probability
one, 

(t) maximizes
P
N
i=1
rV
i
(t)
i
(t) + rV (t)c^((t)) over the set
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
].
18
The
rst-order condition for this problem implies the existence of nonnegative u
i
(t), v
i
(t) such
that for any i,
rV
i
(t)
rV (t)
= ,[c^
i
(

(t)), u
i
(t) + v
i
(t)] ; (C.4)
with u
i
(t)(
i
(t) , m
i
) = v
i
(t)(M
i
, 
i
(t)) = 0. For this specication of u
i
(t) and v
i
(t),
it is then easy to see that 

(t) indeed minimizes the expresssion (C.1) over the set
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
]. The representation (C.2) for the incentive scheme s

() is obtained by
using (C.4) to substitute in the incentive scheme representation given in Theorem 4.1 of
Schattler and Sung (1993).
18
The symbol r is only natational and does not stand for a derivative.
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Conversely if there exist adapted processes u
i
(), v
i
() such that for (almost) every
t, with probability one, 

(t) minimizes the expresssion (C.1) over the set
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
],
then formula (C.2) denes an incentive scheme s

(), and the argument given in the proof
of Theorem 4.2 of Schattler and Sung shows that this incentive scheme implements the
control process 

(). Q.E.D.
Proposition C.1 has the following immediate corollary:
Corollary C.1 An admissible control process 

() is implementable by an
incentive scheme s

() taking the form s

(X()) = s

(
P
N
i=1
X
i
()) if and only
if there exist nonnegative-valued adapted processes u
i
(), v
i
(), i = 1; : : : ; N ,
such that for (almost) every t 2 [0; 1], with probability one, the (possibly hi-
story dependent) control 

(t) minimizes (C.1) over the set
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
] and
moreover c^
i
(

(t)), u
i
(t) + v
i
(t) is the same for all i.
Lemma C.1 For any E 2 [
P
N
i=1
m
i
;
P
N
i=1
M
i
], let (E) be the minimum of
c^() over the set
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
] under the constraint that
P
N
i=1

i
= E, and
let (E) be the corresponding minimizer. The control process 

() satisfying


(t) = (E) for all t is implementable by an incentive scheme s

() taking
the form s

(X()) = s

(
P
N
i=1
X
i
()). Indeed s

() has the form
s

(X) = w + (E) + 
0
(E)
 
N
X
i=1
X
i
(1)
!
+
r
2

0
(E)
2

2
(C.5)
where 
2
=
P
N
i=1
P
N
j=1

ij
.
Proof: The rst-order conditions for (E) can be written as:
c^
i
((E)), u
i
+ v
i
= ; i = 1; : : : ; N; (C.6)
where u
i
, v
i
, i = 1; : : : ; N , are nonnegative, with u
i
(
i
,m
i
) = v
i
(M
i
, 
i
) = 0, and 
is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint
P
N
i=1

i
= E. By the envelope theorem, one
also has

0
(E) =  : (C.7)
The lemma now follows directly from Proposition C.1, Remark C.1, and Corollary C.1.
Q.E.D.
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Proposition C.2 Suppose that E

maximizes the expression
E , (E),
r
2

0
(E)
2
2
4
N
X
i=1
p^
i
k
2
i
,
N
X
i=1
N
X
j=1
p^
i
p^
j
k
i
k
j
3
5
(C.8)
over the interval [
P
N
i=1
m
i
;
P
N
i=1
M
i
]. If the principal observes the aggregate
process Y () :=
P
N
i=1
X
i
(), but not its individual components, then a soluti-
on to the principal's problem is given by the control process 

() satisfying


(t) = (E

) for all t, implemented by the incentive scheme s

() given as
s

(X) = w + (E

) + 
0
(E

)
 
N
X
i=1
X
i
(1)
!
+
r
2

0
(E

)
2

2
: (C.9)
Proof: If the principal observes only the aggregate outcome process, any incentive scheme
s

() that he uses must take the form s

(X()) = s

(
P
N
i=1
X
i
()). With such an incentive
scheme, by Corollary C.1, he can implement a control process 

() if and only if there
exist adapted processes u
i
(); v
i
(); i = 1; : : : ; N , and (), such that for all i, u
i
() and v
i
()
take nonnegative values, and for almost all t, with probability one, 

(t) minimizes (C.1)
over the set
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
], and moreover c^
i
(

(t)), u
i
(t) + v
i
(t) = (t) for i = 1; : : : ; N .
Since 

(t) minimizes (C.1) over the set
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
], one also has u
i
(t)(

i
(t) , m
i
) =
v
i
(t)(M
i
, 

i
(t)) = 0. Thus 

(t) satises the rst-order conditions for the problem of
minimizing c^() over the set
Q
N
i=1
[m
i
;M
i
] under the constraint that
P
N
i=1

i
(t) = E(t),
where E(t) :=
P
N
i=1


i
(t). Given that c^() is convex, it follows that for almost all t,
with probability one, 

(t) = (E(t)), c^(

(t)) = (E(t)), and c^
i
(

(t)), u
i
(t) + v
i
(t) =

0
(E(t)). Upon using these equation to substitute in (C.2), we nd that the function
s

() has the representation
s

(Y ) = w +
Z
1
0
(E(t))dt+
Z
1
0

0
(E(t))dY (t) +
r
2
Z
1
0

0
(E(t))
2
dt
2
: (C.10)
Conditional on the process E(), the principal's net expected payo is then almost surely
equal to
Z
1
0
E(t)dt, w , (E(t))dt,
r
2
Z
1
0

0
(E(t))
2
dt
2
: (C.11)
The denition of E

implies that with probability one this is no larger than
E

, w , (E

),
r
2

0
(E

)
2

2
: (C.12)
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Upon taking expectations with respect to the process E(t), one immediately sees that
the principal's net expected payo from any control process 

() which is implementable
by an incentive scheme of the form s

(X()) = s

(
P
N
i=1
X
i
()) cannot exceed his net
expected payo from the control process 

() satisfying 

(t) = (E

) for all t. Under
the given information assumption the control process 

() is therefore indeed optimal
for the principal. The representation (C.9) of the incentive scheme that implements 

()
is obtained by substituting for E(t) = E

in (C.10) and using the fact that
R
1
0
dY (t) =
Y (1), Y (0) =
P
N
i=1
X
i
(1),
P
N
i=1
X
i
(0) =
P
N
i=1
X
i
(1). Q.E.D.
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